opinion juris sive necessitates

There have been attempts to codify through treaties or multilateral agreements the standards for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, but these have not borne fruition. The members of the European Common Market accede to the Judgments Convention, signed in 1978, which eliminates as to participating countries all of such obstacles to recognition such as reciprocity and révision au fond.⁵³ The most ambitious of these attempts is the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, prepared in 1966 by the Hague Conference of International Law.⁵⁴ While it has not received the ratifications needed to have it take effect,⁵⁵ it is recognized as representing current scholarly thought on the topic.⁵⁶ Neither the Philippines nor the United States are signatories to the Convention.

Yet even if there is no unanimity as to the applicable theory behind the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments or a universal treaty rendering it obligatory force, there is consensus that the viability of such recognition and enforcement is essential. Steiner and Vagts note:

.  .  . The notion of unconnected bodies of national law on private international law, each following a quite separate path, is not one conducive to the growth of a transnational community encouraging travel and commerce among its members. There is a contemporary resurgence of writing stressing the identity or similarity of the values that systems of public and private international law seek to further – a community interest in common, or at least reasonable, rules on these matters in national legal systems. And such generic principles as reciprocity play an important role in both fields.⁵⁷

Salonga, whose treatise on private international law is of worldwide renown, points out:

Whatever be the theory as to the basis for recognizing foreign judgments, there can be little dispute that the end is to protect the reasonable expectations and demands of the parties. Where the parties have submitted a matter for adjudication in the court of one state, and proceedings there are not tainted with irregularity, they may fairly be expected to submit, within the state or elsewhere, to the enforcement of the judgment issued by the court.⁵⁸

There is also consensus as to the requisites for recognition of a foreign judgment and the defenses against the enforcement thereof. As earlier discussed, the exceptions enumerated in Section 48, Rule 39 have remain unchanged since the time they were adapted in this jurisdiction from long standing American rules. The requisites and exceptions as delineated under Section 48 are but a restatement of generally accepted principles of international law. Section 98 of The Restatement, Second, Conflict of Laws, states that "a valid judgment rendered in a foreign nation after a fair trial in a contested proceeding will be recognized in the United States," and on its face, the term "valid" brings into play requirements such notions as valid jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties.⁵⁹ Similarly, the notion that fraud or collusion may preclude the enforcement of a foreign judgment finds affirmation with foreign jurisprudence and commentators,⁶⁰ as well as the doctrine that the foreign judgment must not constitute "a clear mistake of law or fact."⁶¹ And finally, it has been recognized that "public policy" as a defense to the recognition of judgments serves as an umbrella for a variety of concerns in international practice which may lead to a denial of recognition.⁶²

The viability of the public policy defense against the enforcement of a foreign judgment has been recognized in this jurisdiction.⁶³ This defense allows for the application of local standards in reviewing the foreign judgment, especially when such judgment creates only a presumptive right, as it does in cases wherein the judgment is against a person.⁶⁴ The defense is also recognized within the international sphere, as many civil law nations adhere to a broad public policy exception which may result in a denial of recognition when the foreign court, in the light of the choice-of-law rules of the recognizing court, applied the wrong law to the case.⁶⁵ The public policy defense can safeguard against possible abuses to the easy resort to offshore litigation if it can be demonstrated that the original claim is noxious to our constitutional values.

There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the enforcement thereof.  However, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.⁶⁶ The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.⁶⁷

While the definite conceptual parameters of the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments have not been authoritatively established, the Court can assert with certainty that such an undertaking is among those generally accepted principles of international law.⁶⁸ As earlier demonstrated, there is a widespread practice among states accepting in principle the need for such recognition and enforcement, albeit subject to limitations of varying degrees. The fact that there is no binding universal treaty governing the practice is not indicative of a widespread rejection of the principle, but only a disagreement as to the imposable specific rules governing the procedure for recognition and enforcement.

Aside from the widespread practice, it is indubitable that the procedure for recognition and enforcement is embodied in the rules of law, whether statutory or jurisprudential, adopted in various foreign jurisdictions. In the Philippines, this is evidenced primarily by Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which has existed in its current form since the early 1900s. Certainly, the Philippine legal system has long ago accepted into its jurisprudence and procedural rules the viability of an action for enforcement of foreign judgment, as well as the requisites for such valid enforcement, as derived from internationally accepted doctrines.  Again, there may be distinctions as to the rules adopted by each particular state,⁶⁹ but they all prescind from the premise that there is a rule of law obliging states to allow for, however generally, the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment. The bare principle, to our mind, has attained the status of opinio juris in international practice.

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law. [Emphasis supplied]

We characterized "generally accepted principles of international law" as norms of general or customary international law that are binding on all states. We held further:¹¹⁷

[G]enerally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination [of] two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. [Emphasis in the original]

The most widely accepted statement of sources of international law today is Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which provides that the Court shall apply "international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law."¹¹⁸ The material sources of custom include State practice, State legislation, international and national judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and other international instruments, a pattern of treaties in the same form, the practice of international organs, and resolutions relating to legal questions in the UN General Assembly.¹¹⁹ Sometimes referred to as "evidence" of international law,¹²⁰ these sources identify the substance and content of the obligations of States and are indicative of the "State practice" and "opinio juris" requirements of international law.¹²¹ We note the following in these respects:

G.R. No. 182498               December 3, 2009
GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Police Chief Superintendent RAUL CASTAÑEDA, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG); Police Senior Superintendent LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response (PACER); and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM, PNP, Petitioners,
vs. MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by ATTY. FELIPE P. ARCILLA, JR., Attorney-in-Fact, Respondent.

From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners’ claims against Japan.

Baker v. Carr³⁹ remains the starting point for analysis under the political question doctrine. There the US Supreme Court explained that:

x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on question.

In Tañada v. Cuenco,⁴⁰ we held that political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."

G.R. No. 162230               April 28, 2010

ISABELITA C. VINUYA,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

An "exchange of notes" is a record of a routine agreement, that has many similarities with the private law contract. The agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by the representative of the other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting State repeats the text of the offering State to record its assent. The signatories of the letters may be government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads. The technique of exchange of notes is frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid the process of legislative approval.²⁸

In another perspective, the terms "exchange of notes" and "executive agreements" have been used interchangeably, exchange of notes being considered a form of executive agreement that becomes binding through executive action.²⁹ On the other hand, executive agreements concluded by the President "sometimes take the form of exchange of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols.’"³⁰ As former US High Commissioner to the Philippines Francis B. Sayre observed in his work, The Constitutionality of Trade Agreement Acts:

x x x 

 

Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a treaty as "an international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation."³² International agreements may be in the form of (1) treaties that require legislative concurrence after executive ratification; or (2) executive agreements that are similar to treaties, except that they do not require legislative concurrence and are usually less formal and deal with a narrower range of subject matters than treaties.³³

Under international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in terms of their binding effects on the contracting states concerned,³⁴ as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers.³⁵ Neither, on the domestic sphere, can one be held valid if it violates the Constitution.³⁶ Authorities are, however, agreed that one is distinct from another for accepted reasons apart from the concurrence-requirement aspect.³⁷ As has been observed by US constitutional scholars, a treaty has greater "dignity" than an executive agreement, because its constitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty having behind it the authority of the President, the Senate, and the people;³⁸ a ratified treaty, unlike an executive agreement, takes precedence over any prior statutory enactment.³⁹

Petitioner parlays the notion that the Agreement is of dubious validity, partaking as it does of the nature of a treaty; hence, it must be duly concurred in by the Senate. Petitioner takes a cue from Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, in which the Court reproduced the following observations made by US legal scholars: "[I]nternational agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties [while] those embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well established national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature take the form of executive agreements." ⁴⁰

Pressing its point, petitioner submits that the subject of the Agreement does not fall under any of the subject-categories that are enumerated in the Eastern Sea Trading case, and that may be covered by an executive agreement, such as commercial/consular relations, most-favored nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and settlement of claims.

In addition, petitioner foists the applicability to the instant case of Adolfo v. CFI of Zambales and Merchant,⁴¹ holding that an executive agreement through an exchange of notes cannot be used to amend a treaty.

We are not persuaded.

The categorization of subject matters that may be covered by international agreements mentioned in Eastern Sea Trading is not cast in stone. There are no hard and fast rules on the propriety of entering, on a given subject, into a treaty or an executive agreement as an instrument of international relations. The primary consideration in the choice of the form of agreement is the parties’ intent and desire to craft an international agreement in the form they so wish to further their respective interests. Verily, the matter of form takes a back seat when it comes to effectiveness and binding effect of the enforcement of a treaty or an executive agreement, as the parties in either international agreement each labor under the pacta sunt servanda⁴² principle.

G.R. No. 159618               February 1, 2011
BAYAN MUNA, as represented by Rep. SATUR OCAMPO, Rep. CRISPIN BELTRAN, and Rep. LIZA L. MAZA, Petitioner,
vs. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Respondents.

In Mijares v. Ranada,¹⁵ the Court held thus:

[G]enerally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination [of] two elements:

 the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; 

and

 a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.¹⁶ (Emphasis supplied)

"Generally accepted principles of international law" refers to norms of general or customary international law which are binding on all states,¹⁷ i.e., renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, the principle of sovereign immunity,¹⁸ a person's right to life, liberty and due process,¹⁹ and pacta sunt servanda,²⁰ among others. The concept of "generally accepted principles of law" has also been depicted in this wise:

Some legal scholars and judges look upon certain "general principles of law" as a primary source of international law because they have the "character of jus rationale" and are "valid through all kinds of human societies." (Judge Tanaka in his dissenting opinion in the 1966 South West Africa Case, 1966 I.C.J. 296). O'Connell holds that certain priniciples are part of international law because they are "basic to legal systems generally" and hence part of the jus gentium. These principles, he believes, are established by a process of reasoning based on the common identity of all legal systems. If there should be doubt or disagreement, one must look to state practice and determine whether the municipal law principle provides a just and acceptable solution. x x x ²¹ (Emphasis supplied)

Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas defines customary international law as follows:

Custom or customary international law means "a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation [opinio juris]." (Restatement) This statement contains the two basic elements of custom: the material factor, that is, how states behave, and the psychological or subjective factor, that is, why they behave the way they do.

x x x x

The initial factor for determining the existence of custom is the actual behavior of states. This includes several elements: duration, consistency, and generality of the practice of states.

The required duration can be either short or long. x x x

x x x x

Duration therefore is not the most important element. More important is the consistency and the generality of the practice. x x x

x x x x

Once the existence of state practice has been established, it becomes necessary to determine why states behave the way they do. Do states behave the way they do because they consider it obligatory to behave thus or do they do it only as a matter of courtesy? Opinio juris, or the belief that a certain form of behavior is obligatory, is what makes practice an international rule. Without it, practice is not law.²² (Underscoring and Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, customary international law is deemed incorporated into our domestic system.²³

G.R. No. 173034             October 9, 2007
PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs. HEALTH SECRETARY FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III; HEALTH UNDER SECRETARIES DR. ETHELYN P. NIETO, DR. MARGARITA M. GALON, ATTY. ALEXANDER A. PADILLA, & DR. JADE F. DEL MUNDO; and ASSISTANT SECRETARIES DR. MARIO C. VILLAVERDE, DR. DAVID J. LOZADA, AND DR. NEMESIO T. GAKO, respondents.

 

THE RIGHT OF ANGARY

Angary (Lat. jus angariae; Fr. droit d'angarie; Ger. Angarie; from the Gr. ἀγγαρεία, (angaria), the office of an ἄγγαρος, courier or messenger), is the name given to the right of a belligerent (most commonly, a government or other party in conflict) to seize and apply for the purposes of war (or to prevent the enemy from doing so) any kind of property on belligerent territory, including that which may belong to subjects or citizens of a neutral state.

Article 53 of the Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to the Hague Convention of 1899 on the same subject, provides that railway plant, land telegraphs, telephones, steamers and other ships (other than such as are governed by maritime law), though belonging to companies or private persons, may be used for military operations, but "must be restored at the conclusion of peace and indemnities paid for them." Article 54 adds that "the plant of railways coming from neutral states, whether the property of those states or of companies or private persons, shall be sent back to them as soon as possible."

These articles seem to sanction the right of angary against neutral property, while limiting it as against both belligerent and neutral property. It may be considered, however, that the right to use implies as wide a range of contingencies as the "necessity of war" can be made to cover.

Kidnapped and put on trial

At the age of 26, Eichmann joined the Nazi party and became a full member of the Schutzstaffel or SS, the Nazi elite military organization which, under Heinrich Himmler, was responsible for establishing and running the concentration/extermination camps in which millions of inmates died of malnutrition, shooting, systematic mass gassing, or brutal medical experiments. Eichmann became chief of the Gestapo’s Office for Jewish Emigration, and was ultimately responsible for the transport of Jews from all over Nazi-occupied Europe into the concentration camps, where an estimated six million Jews died as part of the Nazis’ ‘Final Solution of the Jewish Question’.³ His principal concern was to maintain the killing capacity of the camps by providing a steady flow of victims. The chain of command in his office was Hitler, Himmler, Heydrich, Müller (Head of the Gestapo), Eichmann.

Kidnapped and put on trial

His principal concern was to maintain the killing capacity of the concentration camps by providing a steady flow of victims.

After WW2, Eichmann fled to Argentina, where he lived in Buenos Aeries as Ricardo Klement until May 1960. He was then kidnapped by Israeli Mossad [secret service] agents, who smuggled him back to Jerusalem on an El Al plane for trial as a war criminal. The Israeli court decided that the legality of Eichmann’s trial was not compromised by the illegality of his capture, as the latter was a political matter. He was indicted on 15 criminal charges, including crimes against humanity and crimes against the Jewish people,⁴ under Israel’s Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law 5710 of 1950.
A series of trials of the other major Nazi War criminals had taken place in the German city of Nuremberg from 1945 to 1949. These centred on war crimes and crimes against humanity and were conducted by the victorious Allies. However, ‘the trial of Adolf Eichmann was initiated and conducted by the Israeli nation and was a Jewish affair. It was the intention of Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion to make Eichmann’s trial a general indictment, not only of Nazi actions, but of anti-Semitism in general.’⁵ ‘Until the Eichmann trial, no other occasion [after Nuremberg] presented itself to communicate on a worldwide scale what the Nazis had done. … Thus the trial provided a unique opportunity to re-educate an older generation and to educate a newer one’, i.e. ‘those who were at the time too young to have been informed by these earlier events’.⁶

Defence arguments rejected

the dispatch of each train by the Accused to Auschwitz or to any other extermination site, carrying one thousand human beings, meant that the Accused was a direct accomplice in a thousand premeditated acts of murder

The contention by the defence that Eichmann could not get a fair trial in Israel was rejected because the case would be tried on the basis of the evidence brought before the court. According to the court, ‘Those who sit in judgment are professional judges, accustomed to weighing evidence; they are carrying out their task in full view of the public.’⁷
The objection that the legislation was retroactive was rejected on the basis that ‘the four major Allies, including America, had sat in judgment at Nuremberg and elsewhere under precisely such retroactive statutes’ and ‘there was no other way to put the culprits on trial’.⁸ The further contention that the acts were done before the creation of the State of Israel, outside its borders, and to people who were not citizens of Israel was rejected on the basis of the universal nature of the crime of genocide, the principle of universal jurisdiction, and the fact that there was no international tribunal with competent jurisdiction, as the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals had long ceased to exist. And ‘At the time of the trial there was no other country that claimed the right or assumed the duty to try Adolf Eichmann.’⁹

Image Wikipedia

Adolf Hitler believed he was promoting evolutionary progress by killing 6 million Jews.

At the trial, Eichmann’s main personal defence was that he was a subordinate lieutenant-colonel (Obersturmbannführer) and as such was only a ‘cog’ obeying ‘superior orders’, albeit zealously, because it was the will of Hitler. Hitler’s orders had possessed the force of law in the Third Reich, and so what had been done was an Act of State. (If the Germans had won he would have been decorated, not hanged.)
This prompted the presiding judge to state: ‘The objective of the crimes … was to obliterate an entire people from the face of the earth.’ … ‘the dispatch of each train by the Accused to Auschwitz or to any other extermination site, carrying one thousand human beings, meant that the Accused was a direct accomplice in a thousand premeditated acts of murder ’ … ‘the Accused acted out of an inner identification with the orders that he was given and out of a fierce will to achieve the criminal objective, and in our opinion it is irrelevant … how this identification and this will came about, and whether they were the outcome of the training which the Accused received under the regime which raised him, as his Counsel argues.’¹⁰
After 14 weeks of testimony, involving 1,543 documents and 100 prosecution witnesses (90 of whom were Nazi concentration camp survivors), Eichmann was found guilty on all charges by the three-judge panel, and sentenced to death by hanging. This was carried out shortly after midnight on May 31/June 1, 1962. His ashes were then speedily scattered over international waters of the Mediterranean Sea to ensure that he would have no final resting place that might serve as a future memorial.