SOFT LAW

The term soft law is used to denote agreements, principles and declarations that are not legally binding. Soft law instruments are predominantly found in the international sphere. ... Hard law refers generally to legal obligations that are binding on the parties involved and which can be legally enforced before a court.

Is the UDHR soft law?

Soft law is indeed conceived as the beginning of a gradual process in which further steps are needed to make of such agreements binding rules for states. ... This in effect has turned the UDHR principles in to hard-law at national levels

Are treaties hard law?

Hard law refers to actual binding legal instruments and laws. ... In international law,hard law includes self-executing treaties or international agreements, as well as customary laws. These instruments result in legally enforceable commitments for countries (states) and other international subjects.

Is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights customary international law?

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), UN General Assembly, 10 December 1948. ... Some international law scholars are of the view that the UDHR has the status of customary international law.

A peremptory norm (also called jus cogensor ius cogens /ˌdʒʌs ˈkoʊdʒɛnz, ˌjʌs/; Latin for "compelling law") is a fundamental principle of international law that is accepted by the international community of states as a norm from which no derogation is permitted.

Is the right to life jus cogens?

The right to life also continues to apply during armed conflict. A violation of the right to life is irreversible. ... The right to life is a well-established and developed part of international law, in treaties, custom, and general principles, and, in its core elements, in the rules of jus cogens

1.What is the legal effect of decisions of the International Court of Justice in cases submitted to it for resolution? (1%)

(A) The decision is binding on other countries in similar situations.
(B) The decision is not binding on any country, even the countries that are parties to the case.
(C) The decision is binding only on the parties but only with respect to that particular case.
(D) The decision is not binding on the parties and is only advisory.
(E) The binding effect on the parties depends on their submission agreement.

2. Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the exclusive economic zone refers to an area. (1%) (A) that is at least 100 miles from the baselines from which the outer limit of the territorial sea is measured

(B) that is at least 200 miles but not to exceed 300 miles from the baselines from which the outer limit of the territorial sea is measured

(C) beyond and adjacent to a country's territorial sea which cannot go beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the outer limit of the territorial sea is measured

(D) that can go beyond 3 nautical miles but cannot extend 300 nautical miles from the baselines from which the outer limit of the territorial sea is measured

(E) None of the above.

3. The President entered into an executive agreement with Vietnam for the supply to the Philippines of animal feeds not to exceed 40,000 tons in any one year. The Association of Animal Feed Sellers of the Philippines questioned the executive agreement for being contrary to R.A. 462 which prohibits the importation of animal feeds from Asian countries. Is the challenge correct? (1%) (A) Yes, the executive agreement is contrary to an existing domestic law.
(B) No, the President is solely in charge of foreign relations and all his actions in this role form part of the law of the land.
(C) No, international agreements are sui generis and stand independently of our domestic laws.
(D) Yes, the executive agreement is actually a treaty which does not take effect without ratification by the Senate.
(E) Yes, the challenge is correct because there is no law empowering the President to undertake the importation.

4. Congress passed Republic Act No. 7711 to comply with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.In a petition filed with the Supreme Court, Anak Ti Ilocos, an association of Ilocano professionals, argued that Republic Act No. 7711discarded the definition of the Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and in related treaties; excluded the Kalayaan Islands and the Scarborough Shoals from the Philippine Archipelagic baselines; and converted internal waters into archipelagic waters. Is the petition meritorious? (6%)

5. The Ambassador of the Republic of Kafiristan referred to you for handling, the case of the Embassy's Maintenance Agreement with CBM, a private domestic company engaged in maintenance work. The Agreement binds CBM, for a defined fee, to maintain the Embassy's elevators, air-conditioning units and electrical facilities. Section 10 of the Agreement provides that the Agreement shall be governed by Philippine laws and that any legal action shall be brought before the proper court of Makati. Kafiristan terminated the Agreement because CBM allegedly did not comply with their agreed maintenance standards.

CBM contested the tennination and filed a complaint againstKafiristan before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The Ambassador wants you to file a motion to dismiss on the ground of state immunity from suit and to oppose the position that under Section 10 of the Agreement, Kafiristan expressly waives its immunity from suit.

Under these facts, can the Embassy successfully invoke immunity from suit? (6%)

6.

During conflict, punishment for violating the laws of war may consist of a specific, deliberate and limited violation of the laws of war in reprisal.

Soldiers who break specific provisions of the laws of war lose the protections and status afforded as prisoners of war but only after facing a "competent tribunal" (GC III Art 5). At that point they become an unlawful combatant but they must still be "treated with humanity and, in case of trial, shall not be deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial", because they are still covered by GC IV Art 5.

Spies and terrorists are only protected by the laws of war if the power which holds them is in a state of armed conflict or war and until they are found to be an unlawful combatant. Depending on the circumstances, they may be subject to civilian law or military tribunal for their acts and in practice have been subjected to torture and/or execution. The laws of war neither approve nor condemn such acts, which fall outside their scope.Spies may only be punished following a trial and if captured after rejoining their army must be treated as a prisoner of war.^[23] Suspected terrorists who are captured during an armed conflict, without having participated in the hostilities, may be detained only in accordance with the GC IV and are entitled to a regular trial.^[24] Countries that have signed the UN Convention Against Torture have committed themselves not to use torture on anyone for any reason.

After a conflict has ended, persons who have committed any breach of the laws of war, and especially atrocities, may be held individually accountable for war crimes through process of law

The Geneva Conventions are the result of a process that developed in a number of stages between 1864 and 1949 which focused on the protection of civilians and those who can no longer fight in an armed conflict. As a result of World War II, all four conventions were revised based on previous revisions and partly on some of the 1907 Hague Conventions and readopted by the international community in 1949. Later conferences have added provisions prohibiting certain methods of warfare and addressing issues of civil wars.

The Geneva Conventions are:

• First Geneva Convention "for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field" (first adopted in 1864, last revision in 1949)
• Second Geneva Convention "for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea" (first adopted in 1949, successor of the 1907 Hague Convention X)
• Third Geneva Convention "relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War" (first adopted in 1929, last revision in 1949)
• Fourth Geneva Convention "relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War" (first adopted in 1949, based on parts of the 1907 Hague Convention IV)

In addition, there are three additional amendment protocols to the Geneva Convention:

• Protocol I (1977): Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts. As of 12 January 2007 it had been ratified by 167 countries.
• Protocol II (1977): Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts. As of 12 January 2007 it had been ratified by 163 countries.
• Protocol III (2005): Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem. As of June 2007 it had been ratified by 17 countries and signed but not yet ratified by an additional 68 countries.

opinion juris sive necessitates

There have been attempts to codify through treaties or multilateral agreements the standards for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, but these have not borne fruition. The members of the European Common Market accede to the Judgments Convention, signed in 1978, which eliminates as to participating countries all of such obstacles to recognition such as reciprocity and révision au fond.⁵³ The most ambitious of these attempts is the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, prepared in 1966 by the Hague Conference of International Law.⁵⁴ While it has not received the ratifications needed to have it take effect,⁵⁵ it is recognized as representing current scholarly thought on the topic.⁵⁶ Neither the Philippines nor the United States are signatories to the Convention.

Yet even if there is no unanimity as to the applicable theory behind the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments or a universal treaty rendering it obligatory force, there is consensus that the viability of such recognition and enforcement is essential. Steiner and Vagts note:

.  .  . The notion of unconnected bodies of national law on private international law, each following a quite separate path, is not one conducive to the growth of a transnational community encouraging travel and commerce among its members. There is a contemporary resurgence of writing stressing the identity or similarity of the values that systems of public and private international law seek to further – a community interest in common, or at least reasonable, rules on these matters in national legal systems. And such generic principles as reciprocity play an important role in both fields.⁵⁷

Salonga, whose treatise on private international law is of worldwide renown, points out:

Whatever be the theory as to the basis for recognizing foreign judgments, there can be little dispute that the end is to protect the reasonable expectations and demands of the parties. Where the parties have submitted a matter for adjudication in the court of one state, and proceedings there are not tainted with irregularity, they may fairly be expected to submit, within the state or elsewhere, to the enforcement of the judgment issued by the court.⁵⁸

There is also consensus as to the requisites for recognition of a foreign judgment and the defenses against the enforcement thereof. As earlier discussed, the exceptions enumerated in Section 48, Rule 39 have remain unchanged since the time they were adapted in this jurisdiction from long standing American rules. The requisites and exceptions as delineated under Section 48 are but a restatement of generally accepted principles of international law. Section 98 of The Restatement, Second, Conflict of Laws, states that "a valid judgment rendered in a foreign nation after a fair trial in a contested proceeding will be recognized in the United States," and on its face, the term "valid" brings into play requirements such notions as valid jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties.⁵⁹ Similarly, the notion that fraud or collusion may preclude the enforcement of a foreign judgment finds affirmation with foreign jurisprudence and commentators,⁶⁰ as well as the doctrine that the foreign judgment must not constitute "a clear mistake of law or fact."⁶¹ And finally, it has been recognized that "public policy" as a defense to the recognition of judgments serves as an umbrella for a variety of concerns in international practice which may lead to a denial of recognition.⁶²

The viability of the public policy defense against the enforcement of a foreign judgment has been recognized in this jurisdiction.⁶³ This defense allows for the application of local standards in reviewing the foreign judgment, especially when such judgment creates only a presumptive right, as it does in cases wherein the judgment is against a person.⁶⁴ The defense is also recognized within the international sphere, as many civil law nations adhere to a broad public policy exception which may result in a denial of recognition when the foreign court, in the light of the choice-of-law rules of the recognizing court, applied the wrong law to the case.⁶⁵ The public policy defense can safeguard against possible abuses to the easy resort to offshore litigation if it can be demonstrated that the original claim is noxious to our constitutional values.

There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the enforcement thereof.  However, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.⁶⁶ The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.⁶⁷

While the definite conceptual parameters of the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments have not been authoritatively established, the Court can assert with certainty that such an undertaking is among those generally accepted principles of international law.⁶⁸ As earlier demonstrated, there is a widespread practice among states accepting in principle the need for such recognition and enforcement, albeit subject to limitations of varying degrees. The fact that there is no binding universal treaty governing the practice is not indicative of a widespread rejection of the principle, but only a disagreement as to the imposable specific rules governing the procedure for recognition and enforcement.

Aside from the widespread practice, it is indubitable that the procedure for recognition and enforcement is embodied in the rules of law, whether statutory or jurisprudential, adopted in various foreign jurisdictions. In the Philippines, this is evidenced primarily by Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which has existed in its current form since the early 1900s. Certainly, the Philippine legal system has long ago accepted into its jurisprudence and procedural rules the viability of an action for enforcement of foreign judgment, as well as the requisites for such valid enforcement, as derived from internationally accepted doctrines.  Again, there may be distinctions as to the rules adopted by each particular state,⁶⁹ but they all prescind from the premise that there is a rule of law obliging states to allow for, however generally, the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment. The bare principle, to our mind, has attained the status of opinio juris in international practice.

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law. [Emphasis supplied]

We characterized "generally accepted principles of international law" as norms of general or customary international law that are binding on all states. We held further:¹¹⁷

[G]enerally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination [of] two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. [Emphasis in the original]

The most widely accepted statement of sources of international law today is Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which provides that the Court shall apply "international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law."¹¹⁸ The material sources of custom include State practice, State legislation, international and national judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and other international instruments, a pattern of treaties in the same form, the practice of international organs, and resolutions relating to legal questions in the UN General Assembly.¹¹⁹ Sometimes referred to as "evidence" of international law,¹²⁰ these sources identify the substance and content of the obligations of States and are indicative of the "State practice" and "opinio juris" requirements of international law.¹²¹ We note the following in these respects:

G.R. No. 182498               December 3, 2009
GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Police Chief Superintendent RAUL CASTAÑEDA, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG); Police Senior Superintendent LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response (PACER); and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM, PNP, Petitioners,
vs. MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by ATTY. FELIPE P. ARCILLA, JR., Attorney-in-Fact, Respondent.

From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners’ claims against Japan.

Baker v. Carr³⁹ remains the starting point for analysis under the political question doctrine. There the US Supreme Court explained that:

x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on question.

In Tañada v. Cuenco,⁴⁰ we held that political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."

G.R. No. 162230               April 28, 2010

ISABELITA C. VINUYA,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY