As Senator Jovito R. Salonga and Former Chief Justice Pedro L. Yap stated in their book, Public International Law (p. 83,1956 ed.):
Permanent international commissions and administrative bodies have been created by the agreement of a considerable number of States for a variety of international purposes, economic or social and mainly non-political. Among the notable instances are the International Labor Organization, the International Institute of Agriculture, the International Danube Commission. In so far as they are autonomous and beyond the control of any one State, they have a distinct juridical personality independent of the municipal law of the State where they are situated. As such, according to one leading authority they must be deemed to possess a species of international personality of their own. (Salonga and Yap, Public International Law, 83 [1956 ed.]
Pursuant to its being a signatory to the Agreement, the Republic of the Philippines agreed to be represented by one Director in governing SEAFDEC Council (Agreement Establishing SEAFDEC, Art. 5, Par. 1,. . .), and that its national laws and regulations shall apply only insofar as its contributions to SEAFDEC of "an agreed amount of money, movable and immovable property and services necessary for the establishment and operation of the Center" are concerned (Art. 11, ibid). It expressly waived the application of the Philippine laws on the disbursement of funds of petitioner SEAFDEC-AQD (Section 2, P.D. No. 292).
The then Minister of Justice likewise opined that Philippine Courts have no jurisdiction over SEAFDEC-AQD in Opinion No. 139, Series of 1984 —
4. One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found. (See Jenks, Id., pp. 37-44). The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such objection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states. In the case at bar, for instance, the entertainment by the National Labor Relations Commission of Mr. Madamba's reinstatement cases would amount to interference by the Philippine Government in the management decisions of the SEARCA governing board; even worse, it could compromise the desired impartiality of the organization since it will have to suit its actuations to the requirements of Philippine law, which may not necessarily coincide with the interests of the other member-states. It is precisely to forestall these possibilities that in cases where the extent of the immunity is specified in the enabling instruments of international organizations (jurisdictional immunity, is specified in the enabling instruments of international organizations), jurisdictional immunity from the host country is invariably among the first accorded. (See Jenks, Id.; See Bowett. The Law of International Institutions. pp. 284-285).
G.R. Nos. 97468-70 September 2, 1993
SOUTHEAST ASIAN FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT CENTER represented by its Chief, DR. FLOR J. LACANILAO, petitioner, vs.DANILO ACOSTA in his capacity as Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations Commission, Regional Arbitration, Branch VI, CORAZON CANTO, DAN BALIAO, ELIZABETH SUPETRAN, CARMELITA FERRER, CATHRYN CONTRADOR, and DORIC VELOSO, respondents.
Monday, January 30, 2012
BROWNELL V. SUNLIFE CANADA(1954)
There is no question that a foreign law may have extraterritorial effect in a country other than the country of origin, provided the latter, in which it is sought to be made operative, gives its consent thereto. This principle is supported by the unquestioned authority.
The jurisdiction of the nation within its territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power in which would impose such restriction. All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source. This consent may be either express or implied. (Philippine Political Law by Sinco, pp. 27-28, citing Chief Justice Marshall's statement in the Exchange, 7 Cranch 116)
In the course of his dissenting opinion in the case of S. S. Lotus, decided by the Permanent Court of International Justice, John Bassett Moore said:
1. It is an admitted principle of International Law that a nation possesses and exercises within its own territory an absolute and exclusive jurisdiction, and that any exception to this right must be traced to the consent of the nation, either express or implied (Schooner Exchange vs. McFadden [812], 7 Cranch 116, 136). The benefit of this principle equally enures to all independent and sovereign States, and is attended with a corresponding responsibility for what takes place within the national territory. (Digest of International Law, by Backworth, Vol. II, pp. 1-2)
The above principle is not denied by respondent-appellant. But its argument on this appeal is that while the acts enacted by the Philippine Congress impliedly accept the benefits of the operation of the United States law (Philippine Property Act of 1946), no provision in the said acts of the Philippine Congress makes said United States law expressly applicable. In answer to this contention, it must be stated that the consent of a Senate to the operation of a foreign law within its territory does not need to be express; it is enough that said consent be implied from its conduct or from that of its authorized officers.
515. No rule of International Law exists which prescribe a necessary form of ratification. — Ratification can, therefore, be given tacitly as well as expressly. Tacit ratification takes place when a State begins the execution of a treaty without expressly ratifying it. It is usual for ratification to take the form of a document duly signed by the Heads of the States concerned and their Secretaries for Foreign Affairs. It is usual to draft as many documents as there are parties to the Convention, and to exchange these documents between the parties. Occasionally the whole of the treaty is recited verbatim in the ratifying documents, but sometimes only the title, preamble, and date of the treaty, and the names of the signatory representatives are cited. As ratification is only the confirmation of an already existing treaty, the essential requirements in a ratifying document is merely that it should refer clearly and unmistakably to the treaty to be ratified. The citation of title, preamble, date, and names of the representatives is, therefore quite sufficient to satisfy that requirements. (Oppenheim, pp. 818-819; emphasis ours.)
International Law does not require that agreements between nations must be concluded in any particular form or style. The law of nations is much more interested in the faithful performance of international obligations than in prescribing procedural requirements. (Treaties and Executive Agreements, by Myers S. McDougal and Asher Lands, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 54, pp. 318-319)
In the case at bar, our ratification of or concurrence to the agreement for the extension of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 is clearly implied from the acts of the President of the Philippines and of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, as well as by the enactment of Republic Acts Nos. 7, 8, and 477.
We must emphasize the fact that the operation of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 in the Philippines is not derived from the unilateral act of the United States Congress, which made it expressly applicable, or from the saving provision contained in the proclamation of independence. It is well-settled in the United States that its laws have no extraterritorial effect. The application of said law in the Philippines is based concurrently on said act (Philippine Property Act of 1946) and on the tacit consent thereto and the conduct of the Philippine Government itself in receiving the benefits of its provisions.
G.R. No. L-5731 June 22, 1954
HERBERT BROWNELL, JR., as Attorney General of the United States, petitioner-appellee, vs.SUN LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA, respondent-appellant
The jurisdiction of the nation within its territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power in which would impose such restriction. All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source. This consent may be either express or implied. (Philippine Political Law by Sinco, pp. 27-28, citing Chief Justice Marshall's statement in the Exchange, 7 Cranch 116)
In the course of his dissenting opinion in the case of S. S. Lotus, decided by the Permanent Court of International Justice, John Bassett Moore said:
1. It is an admitted principle of International Law that a nation possesses and exercises within its own territory an absolute and exclusive jurisdiction, and that any exception to this right must be traced to the consent of the nation, either express or implied (Schooner Exchange vs. McFadden [812], 7 Cranch 116, 136). The benefit of this principle equally enures to all independent and sovereign States, and is attended with a corresponding responsibility for what takes place within the national territory. (Digest of International Law, by Backworth, Vol. II, pp. 1-2)
The above principle is not denied by respondent-appellant. But its argument on this appeal is that while the acts enacted by the Philippine Congress impliedly accept the benefits of the operation of the United States law (Philippine Property Act of 1946), no provision in the said acts of the Philippine Congress makes said United States law expressly applicable. In answer to this contention, it must be stated that the consent of a Senate to the operation of a foreign law within its territory does not need to be express; it is enough that said consent be implied from its conduct or from that of its authorized officers.
515. No rule of International Law exists which prescribe a necessary form of ratification. — Ratification can, therefore, be given tacitly as well as expressly. Tacit ratification takes place when a State begins the execution of a treaty without expressly ratifying it. It is usual for ratification to take the form of a document duly signed by the Heads of the States concerned and their Secretaries for Foreign Affairs. It is usual to draft as many documents as there are parties to the Convention, and to exchange these documents between the parties. Occasionally the whole of the treaty is recited verbatim in the ratifying documents, but sometimes only the title, preamble, and date of the treaty, and the names of the signatory representatives are cited. As ratification is only the confirmation of an already existing treaty, the essential requirements in a ratifying document is merely that it should refer clearly and unmistakably to the treaty to be ratified. The citation of title, preamble, date, and names of the representatives is, therefore quite sufficient to satisfy that requirements. (Oppenheim, pp. 818-819; emphasis ours.)
International Law does not require that agreements between nations must be concluded in any particular form or style. The law of nations is much more interested in the faithful performance of international obligations than in prescribing procedural requirements. (Treaties and Executive Agreements, by Myers S. McDougal and Asher Lands, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 54, pp. 318-319)
In the case at bar, our ratification of or concurrence to the agreement for the extension of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 is clearly implied from the acts of the President of the Philippines and of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, as well as by the enactment of Republic Acts Nos. 7, 8, and 477.
We must emphasize the fact that the operation of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 in the Philippines is not derived from the unilateral act of the United States Congress, which made it expressly applicable, or from the saving provision contained in the proclamation of independence. It is well-settled in the United States that its laws have no extraterritorial effect. The application of said law in the Philippines is based concurrently on said act (Philippine Property Act of 1946) and on the tacit consent thereto and the conduct of the Philippine Government itself in receiving the benefits of its provisions.
G.R. No. L-5731 June 22, 1954
HERBERT BROWNELL, JR., as Attorney General of the United States, petitioner-appellee, vs.SUN LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA, respondent-appellant
In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.
In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of "suggestion," where the foreign state or the international organization sued in an American court requests the Secretary of State to make a determination as to whether it is entitled to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the defendant is immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit to the court a "suggestion" that the defendant is entitled to immunity. In England, a similar procedure is followed, only the Foreign Office issues a certification to that effect instead of submitting a "suggestion" (O'Connell, I International Law 130 [1965]; Note: Immunity from Suit of Foreign Sovereign Instrumentalities and Obligations, 50 Yale Law Journal 1088 [1941]).
In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement to the courts varies. In International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the respondent-employer could not be sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer v. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor General to make, in behalf of the Commander of the United States Naval Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a "suggestion" to respondent Judge. The Solicitor General embodied the "suggestion" in a Manifestation and Memorandum as amicus curiae.
In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office of Legal Affairs moved with this Court to be allowed to intervene on the side of petitioner. The Court allowed the said Department to file its memorandum in support of petitioner's claim of sovereign immunity.
In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to the local courts by the respondents through their private counsels (Raquiza v. Bradford, 75 Phil. 50 [1945]; Miquiabas v. Philippine-Ryukyus Command, 80 Phil. 262 [1948]; United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990] and companion cases). In cases where the foreign states bypass the Foreign Office, the courts can inquire into the facts and make their own determination as to the nature of the acts and transactions involved.
In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of "suggestion," where the foreign state or the international organization sued in an American court requests the Secretary of State to make a determination as to whether it is entitled to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the defendant is immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit to the court a "suggestion" that the defendant is entitled to immunity. In England, a similar procedure is followed, only the Foreign Office issues a certification to that effect instead of submitting a "suggestion" (O'Connell, I International Law 130 [1965]; Note: Immunity from Suit of Foreign Sovereign Instrumentalities and Obligations, 50 Yale Law Journal 1088 [1941]).
In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement to the courts varies. In International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the respondent-employer could not be sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer v. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor General to make, in behalf of the Commander of the United States Naval Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a "suggestion" to respondent Judge. The Solicitor General embodied the "suggestion" in a Manifestation and Memorandum as amicus curiae.
In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office of Legal Affairs moved with this Court to be allowed to intervene on the side of petitioner. The Court allowed the said Department to file its memorandum in support of petitioner's claim of sovereign immunity.
In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to the local courts by the respondents through their private counsels (Raquiza v. Bradford, 75 Phil. 50 [1945]; Miquiabas v. Philippine-Ryukyus Command, 80 Phil. 262 [1948]; United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990] and companion cases). In cases where the foreign states bypass the Foreign Office, the courts can inquire into the facts and make their own determination as to the nature of the acts and transactions involved.
Republic of the PhilippinesCongress of the PhilippinesMetro Manila
Fourteenth CongressThird Regular Session
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-seventh day of July, two thousand nine.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9851
AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING CRIMES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, GENOCIDE AND OTHER CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, ORGANIZING JURISDICTION, DESIGNATING SPECIAL COURTS, AND FOR RELATED PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
CHAPTER IINTRODUCTORY PROVISIONS
Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity".
Section 2. Declaration of Principles and State Policies. -
(a) The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to a policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.
(b) The state values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights, including the rights of indigenous cultural communities and other vulnerable groups, such as women and children;
(c) It shall be the responsibility of the State and all other sectors concerned to resolved armed conflict in order to promote the goal of "Children as Zones of Peace";
(d) The state adopts the generally accepted principles of international law, including the Hague Conventions of 1907, the Geneva Conventions on the protection of victims of war and international humanitarian law, as part of the law our nation;
(e) The most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level, in order to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus contribute to the prevention of such crimes, it being the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes;
(f) The State shall guarantee persons suspected or accused of having committed grave crimes under international law all rights necessary to ensure that their trial will be fair and prompt in strict accordance with national and international law and standards for fair trial, It shall also protect victims, witnesses and their families, and provide appropriate redress to victims and their families, It shall ensure that the legal systems in place provide accessible and gender-sensitive avenues of redress for victims of armed conflict, and
(g)The State recognizes that the application of the provisions of this Act shall not affect the legal status of the parties to a conflict, nor give an implied recognition of the status of belligerency
CHAPTER IIDEFINITION OF TERMS
Section 3. For purposes of this Act, the term:
(a) "Apartheid' means inhumane acts committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that regime
(b) "Arbitrary deportation or forcible transfer of population" means forced displacement of the persons concerned by expultion by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under domestic or international law.
(c) "Armed conflict" means any use of force or armed violence between States or a protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within that State: Provided, That such force or armed violence gives rise, or may give rise, to a situation to which the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, including their common Article 3, apply. Armed conflict may be international, that is, between two (2) or more States, including belligerent occupation; or non-international, that is, between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a state. It does not cover internal disturbances or tensions such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature.
(d) "Armed forces" means all organized armed forces, groups and units that belong to a party to an armed conflict which are under a command responsible to that party for the conduct of its subordinates. Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system which enforces compliance with International Humanitarian Law
(e) "Attack directed against any civilian population" means a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in Section 6 of this Act against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack.
(f) "Effective command and control" or " effective authority and control" means having the material ability to prevent and punish the commission of offenses by subordinates.
(g) "Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons" means the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time
(h) "Enslavement" means the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and children.
(i) "Extermination" means the international infliction of conditions of life, inter alia, the deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of a part of a population.
(j) " Forced pregnancy" means the unlawful confinement of a women to be forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population carrying out other grave violations of international law.
(k) "Hors de Combat" means a person who:
(1) is in the power of an adverse party;
(2) has clearly expressed an intention to surrender; or
(3) has been rendered unconscious or otherwise incapacitated by wounds or sickness and therefore is incapable of defending himself: Provided, that in any of these cases, the person form any hostile act and does not attempt to escape.
(l) "Military necessity" means the necessity of employing measures which are indispensable to achieve a legitimate aim of the conflict and are not otherwise prohibited by International Humanitarian Law
(m) "Non-defended locality" means a locality that fulfills the following conditions:
(1) all combatants, as well as mobile weapons and mobile military equipment, must have been evacuated;
(2) no hostile use of fixed military installations or establishments must have been made;
(3) no acts of hostility must have been committed by the authorities or by the population; and
(4) no activities in support of military operations, must have been undertaken.
(n) "No quarter will be given' means refusing to spare the life of anybody, even of persons manifestly unable to defend themselves or who clearly express their intention to surrender.
(o) "Perfidy" means acts which invite the confidence of an adversary to lead him/her to believe he/she is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of International Humanitarian Law, with the intent to betray that confidence, including but not limited to:
(1) feigning an intent to negotiate under a flag of truce;
(2) feigning surrender;
(3) feigning incapacitation by wounds or sickness;
(4) feigning civilian or noncombatant status; and
(5) feigning protective status by use of signs, emblems or uniforms of the United Nations or of a neutral or other State not party to the conflict.
(p) "Persecution" means the international and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of identity of the group or collectivity.
(q) "Protect person" in an armed conflict means:
(1) a person wounded, sick or shipwrecked, whether civilian or military;
(2) a prisoner of war or any person deprived of liberty for reasons related to an armed conflict;
(3) a civilian or any person not taking a direct part or having ceased to take part in the hostilities in the power of the adverse party;
(4) a person who, before the beginning of hostilities, was considered a stateless person or refugee under the relevant international instruments accepted by the parties to the conflict concerned or under the national legislation of the state of refuge or state of residence;
(5) a member of the medical personnel assigned exclusively to medical purposes or to the administration of medical units or to the operation of or administration of medical transports; or
(6) a member of the religious personnel who is exclusively engaged in the work of their ministry and attached to the armed forces of a party to the conflict, its medical units or medical transports, or non-denominational, noncombatant military personnel carrying out functions similar to religious personnel.
(r) " Superior" means:
(1) a military commander or a person effectively acting as a military commander; or
(2) any other superior, in as much as the crimes arose from activities within the effective authority and control of that superior.
(s) "Torture" means the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical, mental, or psychological, upon a person in the custody or under the control of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions.
(t) "Works and installations containing dangerous forces" means works and installations the attack of which may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population, namely: dams, dikes, and nuclear, electrical generation stations.
CHAPTER IIICRIMES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, GENOCIDE AND OTHER CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
Section 4. War Crimes. - For the purpose of this Act, "war crimes" or "crimes against Interntional Human Humanitarian Law" means:
(a) In case of an international armed conflict , grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts against persons or property protected under provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention:
(1) Willful killing;
(2) Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;
(3) Willfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health;
(4) Extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
(5) Willfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial;
(6) Arbitrary deportation or forcible transfer of population or unlawful confinement;
(7) Taking of hostages;
(8) Compelling a prisoner a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile power; and
(9) Unjustifiable delay in the repatriation of prisoners of war or other protected persons.
(b) In case of a non-international armed conflict, serious violations of common Article 3 to the four (4) Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely , any of the following acts committed against persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including member of the armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause;
(1) Violence to life and person, in particular, willful killings, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(2) Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;
(3) Taking of hostages; and
(4) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all judicial guarantees which are generally recognized as indispensable.
(c) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflict, within the established framework of international law, namely:
(1) Internationally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities;
(2) Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, object which are not military objectives;
(3) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical units and transport, and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions or Additional Protocol III in conformity with intentional law;
(4) Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as ling as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict;
(5) Launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated;
(6) Launching an attack against works or installations containing dangerous forces in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects, and causing death or serious injury to body or health .
(7) Attacking or bombarding, by whatever means, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended and which are not military objectives, or making non-defended localities or demilitarized zones the object of attack;
(8) Killing or wounding a person in the knowledge that he/she is hors de combat, including a combatant who, having laid down his/her arms or no longer having means of defense, has surrendered at discretion;
(9) Making improper use of a flag of truce, of the flag or the military insignia and uniform of the enemy or of the United Nations, as well as of the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions or other protective signs under International Humanitarian Law, resulting in death, serious personal injury or capture;
(10) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives. In case of doubt whether such building or place has been used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used;
(11) Subjecting persons who are in the power of an adverse party to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of any kind, or to removal of tissue or organs for transplantation, which are neither justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of the person concerned nor carried out in his/her interest, and which cause death to or seriously endanger the health of such person or persons;
(12) Killing, wounding or capturing an adversary by resort to perfidy;
(13) Declaring that no quarter will be given;
(14) Destroying or seizing the enemy's property unless such destruction or seizure is imperatively demanded by the necessities of war;
(15) Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault;
(16) Ordering the displacements of the civilian population for reasons related to the conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand;
(17) Transferring, directly or indirectly, by the occupying power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside this territory;
(18) Commiting outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatments;
(19) Commiting rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions or a serious violation of common Article 3 to the Geneva Convensions;
(20) Utilizing the presence of a civilian or other protected person to render certain points, areas or military forces immune from military operations;
(21) Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects indespensable to their survival, including willfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols;
(22) In an international armed conflict, compelling the nationals of the hostile party to take part in the operations of war directed against their own country, even if they were in the belligerent's service before the commencement of the war;
(23) In an international armed conflict, declaring abolished, suspended or inadmissible in a court of law the rights and actions of the nationals of the hostile party;
(24) Commiting any of the following acts:
(i) Conscripting, enlisting or recruiting children under the age of fifteen (15) years into the national armed forces;
(ii) Conscripting, enlisting or recruiting children under the age of eighteen (18) years into an armed force or group other than the national armed forces; and
(iii) Using children under the age of eighteen (18) years to participate actively in hostilities; and
(25) Employing means of warfare which are prohibited under international law, such as:
(i) Poison or poisoned weapons;
(ii) Asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices;
(iii) Bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with hard envelopes which do not entirely cover the core or are pierced with incisions; and
(iv) Weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare which are of the nature to cause superfluous injury or unecessary suffering or which are inherently indiscriminate in violation of the international law of armed conflict.
Any person found guilty of commiting any of the acts specified herein shall suffer the penalty provided under Section 7 of this Act.
Section 5. Genocide - (a) For the purpose of this Act, "genocide" means any of the following acts with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, religious, social or any other similar stable and permanent group as such:
(1) Killing members of the group;
(2) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(3) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(4) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and
(5) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to directly and publicly incite others to commit genocide.
Any person found guilty of committing any of the acts specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section shall suffer the penalty provided under Section 7 of this Act.
Section 6. Other Crimes Against Humanity. - For the purpose of this act, "other crimes against humanity" means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:
(a) Willful killing;
(b) Extermination;
(c) Enslavement;
(d) Arbitrary deportation or forcible transfer of population;
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law;
(f) Torture;
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, sexual orientation or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime defined in this Act;
(i) Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons;
(j) Apartheid; and
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.
Any person found guilty of committing any of the acts specified herein shall suffer the penalty provided under Section 7 of this Act.
CHAPTER IVPENAL PROVISIONS
Section 7. Penalties. - Any person found guilty of committing any of the acts provided under Sections 4, 5 and 6 of this Act shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium to maximum period and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (Php 100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (Php 500,000.00).
When justified by the extreme gravity of the crime, especially where the commision of any of the crimes specified herein results in death or serious physical injury, or constitutes rape, and considering the individual circumstances of the accused, the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (Php 500,000.00) to One million pesos (Php 1,000,000.00) shall be imposed.
Any person found guilty of inciting others to commit genocide referred to in Section 5(b) of this Act shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine ranging from Ten thousand pesos (Php 10,000.00) to Twenty thousand pesos (Php 20,000.00).
In addition, the court shall order the forfeiture of proceeds, property and assets derived, directly or indirectly, from that crime, without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third (3rd) parties. The court shall also impose the corresponding accessory penalties under the Revised Penal Code, especially where the offender is a public officer.
CHAPTER VSOME PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Section 8. Individual Criminal Responsibilities. - (a) In addition to existing provisions in Philippine law on principles of criminal responsibility, a person shall be criminally liable as principal for a crime defined and penalized in this Act if he/she:
(1) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible;
(2) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is attempted;
(3) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a group of person acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either:
(i) be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime defined in this Act; or
(ii) be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime.
(b) A person shall be criminally liable as accomplice for facilitating the commission of a crime defined and penalized in this Act if he/she aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission.
(c) A person shall be criminally liable for a crime defined and penalized in this Act if he/she attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its execution by means of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur because of circumstances independent of the person's intention. However, a person who abandons the effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevents the completion of the crime shall not be liable for punishment under this Act for the attempt to commit the same if he/she completely and voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose.
Section 9. Irrelevance of Official Capacity. - This Act shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a head of state or government, a member of a government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Act, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence. However:
(a) Immunities or special procedural rules that may be attached to the official capacity of a person under Philippine law other than the established constitutional immunity from suit of the Philippine President during his/her tenure, shall not bar the court from exercising jurisdiction over such a person; and
(b) Immunities that may be attached to the official capacity of a person under international law may limit the application of this Act, nut only within the bounds established under international law.
Section 10. Responsibility of Superiors. - In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility for crimes defined and penalized under this Act, a superior shall be criminally responsible as a principal for such crimes committed by subordinates under his/her effective command and control, or effective authority and control as the case may be, as a result of his/her failure to properly exercise control over such subordinates, where:
(a) That superior either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that the subordinates were committing or about to commit such crimes;
(b) That superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his/her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.
Section 11. Non-prescription. - The crimes defined and penalized under this Act, their prosecution, and the execution of sentences imposed on their account, shall not be subject to any prescription.
Section 12. Orders from a Superior. - The fact that a crime defined and penalized under this Act has been committed by a person pursuant to an order of a government or a superior, whether military or civilian, shall not relieve that person of criminal responsibility unless all of the following elements occur:
(a) The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the government or the superior in question;
(b) The person did not know that the order was unlawful; and
(c) The order was not manifestly unlawful.
For the purposes of this section, orders to commit genocide or other crimes against humanity are manifestly unlawful.
CHAPTER VIProtection of Victims and Witnesses
Section 13. Protection of Victims and Witnesses. - In addition to existing provisions in Philippine law for the protection of victims and witnesses, the following measures shall be undertaken:
(a) The Philippine court shall take appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical and physiological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses. In so doing, the court shall have regard of all relevant factors, including age, gender and health, and the nature of the crime, in particular, but not limited to, where the crime involves sexual or gender violence or violence against children. The prosecutor shall take such measures particularly during the investigation and prosecution of such crimes. These measures shall not be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and to a fair and impartial trial;
(b) As an exception to the general principle of public hearings, the court may, to protect the victims and witnesses or an accused, conduct any part of the proceedings in camera or allow the presentation of evidence by electronic or other special means. In particular, such measures shall be implemented in the case of the victim of sexual violence or a child who is a victim or is a witness, unless otherwise ordered by the court, having regard to all the circumstances, particularly the views of the victim or witness;
(c) Where the personal interests of the victims are affected, the court shall permit their views and concerns to be presented and considered at stages of the proceedings determined to be appropriate by the court in manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial. Such views and concerns may be presented by the legal representatives of the victims where the court considers it appropriate in accordance with the established rules of procedure and evidence; and
(d) Where the disclosure of evidence or information pursuant to this Act may lead to the grave endangerment of the security of a witness for his/her family, the prosecution may, for the purposes of any proceedings conducted prior to the commencement of the trial, withhold such evidence or information and instead submit a summary thereof. Such measures shall be exercised in a manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and to a fair and impartial trial.
Section 14. Reparations to Victims. - In addition to existing provisions in Philippine law and procedural rules for reparations to victims, the following measures shall be undertaken:
(a) The court shall follow the principles relating to the reparations to, or in respect of, victims,including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. On this basis, in its decision, the court may, wither upon request or on its own motion in exceptional circumstances, determine the scope and extent of any damage, loss and injury to, or in respect of, victims and state the principles on which it is acting;1avvphi1
(b) The court may make an order directly against a convicted person specifying appropriate reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation; and
(c) Before making an order under this section, the court may invite and shall take account of representations from or on behalf of the convicted person, victims or other interested persons.
Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as prejudicing the rights of victims under national or international law.
CHAPTER VIIApplicability of International Law and Other Laws
Section 15. Applicability of International Law.- In the application and interpretation of this Act, Philippine courts shall be guided by the following sources:
(a) The 1948 Genocide Convention;
(b) The 1949 Genava Conventions I-IV, their 1977 Additional Protocols I and II and their 2005 Additional Protocol III;
(c) The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, its First Protocol and its 1999 Second Protocol;
(d) The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child and its 2000 Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict;
(e) The rules and principles of customary international law;
(f) The judicial decisions of international courts and tribunals;
(g) Relevant and applicable international human rights instruments;
(h) Other relevant international treaties and conventions ratified or acceded to by the Republic of the Philippines; and
(i) Teachings of the most highly qualified publicists and authoritative commentaries on the foregoing sources as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of international law.
Section 16. Suppletory Application of the Revised Penal Code and Other General or Special Laws. - The provisions of the Revised Penal Code and other general or special laws shall have a suppletory application to the provisions of this Act.
CHAPTER VIIJURISDICTION
Section 17. Jurisdiction.- The State shall exercise jurisdiction over persons, whether military or civilian, suspected or accused of a crime defined and penalized in this Act, regardless of where the crime is committed, provided, any one of the following conditions is met:
(a) The accused is a Filipino citizen;
(b) The accused, regardless of citizenship or residence, is present in the Philippines; or
(c) The accused has committed the said crime against a Filipino citizen.
In the interest of justice, the relevant Philippine authorities may dispense with the investigation or prosecution of a crime punishable under this Act if another court or international tribunal is already conducting the investigation or undertaking the prosecution of such crime. Instead, the authorities may surrender or extradite suspected or accused persons in the Philippines to the appropriate international court, if any, or to another State pursuant to the applicable extradition laws and treaties.
No criminal proceedings shall be initiated against foreign nationals suspected or accused of having committed the crimes defined and penalized in this Act if they have been tried by a competent court outside the Philippines in respect of the same offense and acquitted, or having been convicted, already served their sentence.
Section 18. Philippine Court, Prosecutors and Investigators. - The Regional Trial Court of the Philippines shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over the crimes punishable under this Act. Their judgments may be appealed or elevated to the Court of Appeals and to the Supreme Court as provided by law.
The Supreme Court shall designate special courts to try cases involving crimes punishable under this Act. For these cases, the Commission on Human Rights, the Department of Justice, the Philippine National Police or other concerned law enforcement agencies shall designate prosecutors or investigators as the case may be.
The State shall ensure that judges, prosecutors and investigators, especially those designated for purposes of this Act, receive effective training in human rights, International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law.
CHAPTER IXFINAL PROVISIONS
Section 19. Separability Clause. - If, for any reason or reasons, any part or provision of this Statute shall be held to be unconstitutional or invalid, other parts or provisions hereof which are not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect.
Section 20. Repealing Clause. - All laws, presidential decrees and issuances, executive orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Statute are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 21. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers general circulation.
Approved,
Sgd. PROSPERO C. NOGRALESSpeaker of the House of Representative
Sgd. JUAN PONCE ENRILEPresident of the Senate
This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2669 and House Bill No. 6633 was finally passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives on October 14, 2009 and October 16, 2009, respectively.
For:
Sgd. MARILYN B. BARUA-YAPSecretary GeneralHouse of Representatives
Sgd. EMMA LIRIO-REYESSecretary of the Senate
Approved:
Sgd. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYOPresident of the Philippines
December 11, 2009
Fourteenth CongressThird Regular Session
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-seventh day of July, two thousand nine.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9851
AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING CRIMES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, GENOCIDE AND OTHER CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, ORGANIZING JURISDICTION, DESIGNATING SPECIAL COURTS, AND FOR RELATED PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
CHAPTER IINTRODUCTORY PROVISIONS
Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity".
Section 2. Declaration of Principles and State Policies. -
(a) The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to a policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.
(b) The state values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights, including the rights of indigenous cultural communities and other vulnerable groups, such as women and children;
(c) It shall be the responsibility of the State and all other sectors concerned to resolved armed conflict in order to promote the goal of "Children as Zones of Peace";
(d) The state adopts the generally accepted principles of international law, including the Hague Conventions of 1907, the Geneva Conventions on the protection of victims of war and international humanitarian law, as part of the law our nation;
(e) The most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level, in order to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus contribute to the prevention of such crimes, it being the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes;
(f) The State shall guarantee persons suspected or accused of having committed grave crimes under international law all rights necessary to ensure that their trial will be fair and prompt in strict accordance with national and international law and standards for fair trial, It shall also protect victims, witnesses and their families, and provide appropriate redress to victims and their families, It shall ensure that the legal systems in place provide accessible and gender-sensitive avenues of redress for victims of armed conflict, and
(g)The State recognizes that the application of the provisions of this Act shall not affect the legal status of the parties to a conflict, nor give an implied recognition of the status of belligerency
CHAPTER IIDEFINITION OF TERMS
Section 3. For purposes of this Act, the term:
(a) "Apartheid' means inhumane acts committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that regime
(b) "Arbitrary deportation or forcible transfer of population" means forced displacement of the persons concerned by expultion by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under domestic or international law.
(c) "Armed conflict" means any use of force or armed violence between States or a protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within that State: Provided, That such force or armed violence gives rise, or may give rise, to a situation to which the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, including their common Article 3, apply. Armed conflict may be international, that is, between two (2) or more States, including belligerent occupation; or non-international, that is, between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a state. It does not cover internal disturbances or tensions such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature.
(d) "Armed forces" means all organized armed forces, groups and units that belong to a party to an armed conflict which are under a command responsible to that party for the conduct of its subordinates. Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system which enforces compliance with International Humanitarian Law
(e) "Attack directed against any civilian population" means a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in Section 6 of this Act against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack.
(f) "Effective command and control" or " effective authority and control" means having the material ability to prevent and punish the commission of offenses by subordinates.
(g) "Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons" means the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time
(h) "Enslavement" means the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and children.
(i) "Extermination" means the international infliction of conditions of life, inter alia, the deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of a part of a population.
(j) " Forced pregnancy" means the unlawful confinement of a women to be forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population carrying out other grave violations of international law.
(k) "Hors de Combat" means a person who:
(1) is in the power of an adverse party;
(2) has clearly expressed an intention to surrender; or
(3) has been rendered unconscious or otherwise incapacitated by wounds or sickness and therefore is incapable of defending himself: Provided, that in any of these cases, the person form any hostile act and does not attempt to escape.
(l) "Military necessity" means the necessity of employing measures which are indispensable to achieve a legitimate aim of the conflict and are not otherwise prohibited by International Humanitarian Law
(m) "Non-defended locality" means a locality that fulfills the following conditions:
(1) all combatants, as well as mobile weapons and mobile military equipment, must have been evacuated;
(2) no hostile use of fixed military installations or establishments must have been made;
(3) no acts of hostility must have been committed by the authorities or by the population; and
(4) no activities in support of military operations, must have been undertaken.
(n) "No quarter will be given' means refusing to spare the life of anybody, even of persons manifestly unable to defend themselves or who clearly express their intention to surrender.
(o) "Perfidy" means acts which invite the confidence of an adversary to lead him/her to believe he/she is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of International Humanitarian Law, with the intent to betray that confidence, including but not limited to:
(1) feigning an intent to negotiate under a flag of truce;
(2) feigning surrender;
(3) feigning incapacitation by wounds or sickness;
(4) feigning civilian or noncombatant status; and
(5) feigning protective status by use of signs, emblems or uniforms of the United Nations or of a neutral or other State not party to the conflict.
(p) "Persecution" means the international and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of identity of the group or collectivity.
(q) "Protect person" in an armed conflict means:
(1) a person wounded, sick or shipwrecked, whether civilian or military;
(2) a prisoner of war or any person deprived of liberty for reasons related to an armed conflict;
(3) a civilian or any person not taking a direct part or having ceased to take part in the hostilities in the power of the adverse party;
(4) a person who, before the beginning of hostilities, was considered a stateless person or refugee under the relevant international instruments accepted by the parties to the conflict concerned or under the national legislation of the state of refuge or state of residence;
(5) a member of the medical personnel assigned exclusively to medical purposes or to the administration of medical units or to the operation of or administration of medical transports; or
(6) a member of the religious personnel who is exclusively engaged in the work of their ministry and attached to the armed forces of a party to the conflict, its medical units or medical transports, or non-denominational, noncombatant military personnel carrying out functions similar to religious personnel.
(r) " Superior" means:
(1) a military commander or a person effectively acting as a military commander; or
(2) any other superior, in as much as the crimes arose from activities within the effective authority and control of that superior.
(s) "Torture" means the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical, mental, or psychological, upon a person in the custody or under the control of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions.
(t) "Works and installations containing dangerous forces" means works and installations the attack of which may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population, namely: dams, dikes, and nuclear, electrical generation stations.
CHAPTER IIICRIMES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, GENOCIDE AND OTHER CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
Section 4. War Crimes. - For the purpose of this Act, "war crimes" or "crimes against Interntional Human Humanitarian Law" means:
(a) In case of an international armed conflict , grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts against persons or property protected under provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention:
(1) Willful killing;
(2) Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;
(3) Willfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health;
(4) Extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
(5) Willfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial;
(6) Arbitrary deportation or forcible transfer of population or unlawful confinement;
(7) Taking of hostages;
(8) Compelling a prisoner a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile power; and
(9) Unjustifiable delay in the repatriation of prisoners of war or other protected persons.
(b) In case of a non-international armed conflict, serious violations of common Article 3 to the four (4) Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely , any of the following acts committed against persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including member of the armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause;
(1) Violence to life and person, in particular, willful killings, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(2) Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;
(3) Taking of hostages; and
(4) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all judicial guarantees which are generally recognized as indispensable.
(c) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflict, within the established framework of international law, namely:
(1) Internationally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities;
(2) Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, object which are not military objectives;
(3) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical units and transport, and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions or Additional Protocol III in conformity with intentional law;
(4) Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as ling as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict;
(5) Launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated;
(6) Launching an attack against works or installations containing dangerous forces in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects, and causing death or serious injury to body or health .
(7) Attacking or bombarding, by whatever means, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended and which are not military objectives, or making non-defended localities or demilitarized zones the object of attack;
(8) Killing or wounding a person in the knowledge that he/she is hors de combat, including a combatant who, having laid down his/her arms or no longer having means of defense, has surrendered at discretion;
(9) Making improper use of a flag of truce, of the flag or the military insignia and uniform of the enemy or of the United Nations, as well as of the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions or other protective signs under International Humanitarian Law, resulting in death, serious personal injury or capture;
(10) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives. In case of doubt whether such building or place has been used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used;
(11) Subjecting persons who are in the power of an adverse party to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of any kind, or to removal of tissue or organs for transplantation, which are neither justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of the person concerned nor carried out in his/her interest, and which cause death to or seriously endanger the health of such person or persons;
(12) Killing, wounding or capturing an adversary by resort to perfidy;
(13) Declaring that no quarter will be given;
(14) Destroying or seizing the enemy's property unless such destruction or seizure is imperatively demanded by the necessities of war;
(15) Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault;
(16) Ordering the displacements of the civilian population for reasons related to the conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand;
(17) Transferring, directly or indirectly, by the occupying power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside this territory;
(18) Commiting outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatments;
(19) Commiting rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions or a serious violation of common Article 3 to the Geneva Convensions;
(20) Utilizing the presence of a civilian or other protected person to render certain points, areas or military forces immune from military operations;
(21) Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects indespensable to their survival, including willfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols;
(22) In an international armed conflict, compelling the nationals of the hostile party to take part in the operations of war directed against their own country, even if they were in the belligerent's service before the commencement of the war;
(23) In an international armed conflict, declaring abolished, suspended or inadmissible in a court of law the rights and actions of the nationals of the hostile party;
(24) Commiting any of the following acts:
(i) Conscripting, enlisting or recruiting children under the age of fifteen (15) years into the national armed forces;
(ii) Conscripting, enlisting or recruiting children under the age of eighteen (18) years into an armed force or group other than the national armed forces; and
(iii) Using children under the age of eighteen (18) years to participate actively in hostilities; and
(25) Employing means of warfare which are prohibited under international law, such as:
(i) Poison or poisoned weapons;
(ii) Asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices;
(iii) Bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with hard envelopes which do not entirely cover the core or are pierced with incisions; and
(iv) Weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare which are of the nature to cause superfluous injury or unecessary suffering or which are inherently indiscriminate in violation of the international law of armed conflict.
Any person found guilty of commiting any of the acts specified herein shall suffer the penalty provided under Section 7 of this Act.
Section 5. Genocide - (a) For the purpose of this Act, "genocide" means any of the following acts with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, religious, social or any other similar stable and permanent group as such:
(1) Killing members of the group;
(2) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(3) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(4) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and
(5) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to directly and publicly incite others to commit genocide.
Any person found guilty of committing any of the acts specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section shall suffer the penalty provided under Section 7 of this Act.
Section 6. Other Crimes Against Humanity. - For the purpose of this act, "other crimes against humanity" means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:
(a) Willful killing;
(b) Extermination;
(c) Enslavement;
(d) Arbitrary deportation or forcible transfer of population;
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law;
(f) Torture;
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, sexual orientation or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime defined in this Act;
(i) Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons;
(j) Apartheid; and
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.
Any person found guilty of committing any of the acts specified herein shall suffer the penalty provided under Section 7 of this Act.
CHAPTER IVPENAL PROVISIONS
Section 7. Penalties. - Any person found guilty of committing any of the acts provided under Sections 4, 5 and 6 of this Act shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium to maximum period and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (Php 100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (Php 500,000.00).
When justified by the extreme gravity of the crime, especially where the commision of any of the crimes specified herein results in death or serious physical injury, or constitutes rape, and considering the individual circumstances of the accused, the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (Php 500,000.00) to One million pesos (Php 1,000,000.00) shall be imposed.
Any person found guilty of inciting others to commit genocide referred to in Section 5(b) of this Act shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine ranging from Ten thousand pesos (Php 10,000.00) to Twenty thousand pesos (Php 20,000.00).
In addition, the court shall order the forfeiture of proceeds, property and assets derived, directly or indirectly, from that crime, without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third (3rd) parties. The court shall also impose the corresponding accessory penalties under the Revised Penal Code, especially where the offender is a public officer.
CHAPTER VSOME PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Section 8. Individual Criminal Responsibilities. - (a) In addition to existing provisions in Philippine law on principles of criminal responsibility, a person shall be criminally liable as principal for a crime defined and penalized in this Act if he/she:
(1) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible;
(2) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is attempted;
(3) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a group of person acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either:
(i) be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime defined in this Act; or
(ii) be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime.
(b) A person shall be criminally liable as accomplice for facilitating the commission of a crime defined and penalized in this Act if he/she aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission.
(c) A person shall be criminally liable for a crime defined and penalized in this Act if he/she attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its execution by means of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur because of circumstances independent of the person's intention. However, a person who abandons the effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevents the completion of the crime shall not be liable for punishment under this Act for the attempt to commit the same if he/she completely and voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose.
Section 9. Irrelevance of Official Capacity. - This Act shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a head of state or government, a member of a government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Act, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence. However:
(a) Immunities or special procedural rules that may be attached to the official capacity of a person under Philippine law other than the established constitutional immunity from suit of the Philippine President during his/her tenure, shall not bar the court from exercising jurisdiction over such a person; and
(b) Immunities that may be attached to the official capacity of a person under international law may limit the application of this Act, nut only within the bounds established under international law.
Section 10. Responsibility of Superiors. - In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility for crimes defined and penalized under this Act, a superior shall be criminally responsible as a principal for such crimes committed by subordinates under his/her effective command and control, or effective authority and control as the case may be, as a result of his/her failure to properly exercise control over such subordinates, where:
(a) That superior either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that the subordinates were committing or about to commit such crimes;
(b) That superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his/her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.
Section 11. Non-prescription. - The crimes defined and penalized under this Act, their prosecution, and the execution of sentences imposed on their account, shall not be subject to any prescription.
Section 12. Orders from a Superior. - The fact that a crime defined and penalized under this Act has been committed by a person pursuant to an order of a government or a superior, whether military or civilian, shall not relieve that person of criminal responsibility unless all of the following elements occur:
(a) The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the government or the superior in question;
(b) The person did not know that the order was unlawful; and
(c) The order was not manifestly unlawful.
For the purposes of this section, orders to commit genocide or other crimes against humanity are manifestly unlawful.
CHAPTER VIProtection of Victims and Witnesses
Section 13. Protection of Victims and Witnesses. - In addition to existing provisions in Philippine law for the protection of victims and witnesses, the following measures shall be undertaken:
(a) The Philippine court shall take appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical and physiological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses. In so doing, the court shall have regard of all relevant factors, including age, gender and health, and the nature of the crime, in particular, but not limited to, where the crime involves sexual or gender violence or violence against children. The prosecutor shall take such measures particularly during the investigation and prosecution of such crimes. These measures shall not be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and to a fair and impartial trial;
(b) As an exception to the general principle of public hearings, the court may, to protect the victims and witnesses or an accused, conduct any part of the proceedings in camera or allow the presentation of evidence by electronic or other special means. In particular, such measures shall be implemented in the case of the victim of sexual violence or a child who is a victim or is a witness, unless otherwise ordered by the court, having regard to all the circumstances, particularly the views of the victim or witness;
(c) Where the personal interests of the victims are affected, the court shall permit their views and concerns to be presented and considered at stages of the proceedings determined to be appropriate by the court in manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial. Such views and concerns may be presented by the legal representatives of the victims where the court considers it appropriate in accordance with the established rules of procedure and evidence; and
(d) Where the disclosure of evidence or information pursuant to this Act may lead to the grave endangerment of the security of a witness for his/her family, the prosecution may, for the purposes of any proceedings conducted prior to the commencement of the trial, withhold such evidence or information and instead submit a summary thereof. Such measures shall be exercised in a manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and to a fair and impartial trial.
Section 14. Reparations to Victims. - In addition to existing provisions in Philippine law and procedural rules for reparations to victims, the following measures shall be undertaken:
(a) The court shall follow the principles relating to the reparations to, or in respect of, victims,including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. On this basis, in its decision, the court may, wither upon request or on its own motion in exceptional circumstances, determine the scope and extent of any damage, loss and injury to, or in respect of, victims and state the principles on which it is acting;1avvphi1
(b) The court may make an order directly against a convicted person specifying appropriate reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation; and
(c) Before making an order under this section, the court may invite and shall take account of representations from or on behalf of the convicted person, victims or other interested persons.
Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as prejudicing the rights of victims under national or international law.
CHAPTER VIIApplicability of International Law and Other Laws
Section 15. Applicability of International Law.- In the application and interpretation of this Act, Philippine courts shall be guided by the following sources:
(a) The 1948 Genocide Convention;
(b) The 1949 Genava Conventions I-IV, their 1977 Additional Protocols I and II and their 2005 Additional Protocol III;
(c) The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, its First Protocol and its 1999 Second Protocol;
(d) The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child and its 2000 Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict;
(e) The rules and principles of customary international law;
(f) The judicial decisions of international courts and tribunals;
(g) Relevant and applicable international human rights instruments;
(h) Other relevant international treaties and conventions ratified or acceded to by the Republic of the Philippines; and
(i) Teachings of the most highly qualified publicists and authoritative commentaries on the foregoing sources as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of international law.
Section 16. Suppletory Application of the Revised Penal Code and Other General or Special Laws. - The provisions of the Revised Penal Code and other general or special laws shall have a suppletory application to the provisions of this Act.
CHAPTER VIIJURISDICTION
Section 17. Jurisdiction.- The State shall exercise jurisdiction over persons, whether military or civilian, suspected or accused of a crime defined and penalized in this Act, regardless of where the crime is committed, provided, any one of the following conditions is met:
(a) The accused is a Filipino citizen;
(b) The accused, regardless of citizenship or residence, is present in the Philippines; or
(c) The accused has committed the said crime against a Filipino citizen.
In the interest of justice, the relevant Philippine authorities may dispense with the investigation or prosecution of a crime punishable under this Act if another court or international tribunal is already conducting the investigation or undertaking the prosecution of such crime. Instead, the authorities may surrender or extradite suspected or accused persons in the Philippines to the appropriate international court, if any, or to another State pursuant to the applicable extradition laws and treaties.
No criminal proceedings shall be initiated against foreign nationals suspected or accused of having committed the crimes defined and penalized in this Act if they have been tried by a competent court outside the Philippines in respect of the same offense and acquitted, or having been convicted, already served their sentence.
Section 18. Philippine Court, Prosecutors and Investigators. - The Regional Trial Court of the Philippines shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over the crimes punishable under this Act. Their judgments may be appealed or elevated to the Court of Appeals and to the Supreme Court as provided by law.
The Supreme Court shall designate special courts to try cases involving crimes punishable under this Act. For these cases, the Commission on Human Rights, the Department of Justice, the Philippine National Police or other concerned law enforcement agencies shall designate prosecutors or investigators as the case may be.
The State shall ensure that judges, prosecutors and investigators, especially those designated for purposes of this Act, receive effective training in human rights, International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law.
CHAPTER IXFINAL PROVISIONS
Section 19. Separability Clause. - If, for any reason or reasons, any part or provision of this Statute shall be held to be unconstitutional or invalid, other parts or provisions hereof which are not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect.
Section 20. Repealing Clause. - All laws, presidential decrees and issuances, executive orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Statute are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 21. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers general circulation.
Approved,
Sgd. PROSPERO C. NOGRALESSpeaker of the House of Representative
Sgd. JUAN PONCE ENRILEPresident of the Senate
This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2669 and House Bill No. 6633 was finally passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives on October 14, 2009 and October 16, 2009, respectively.
For:
Sgd. MARILYN B. BARUA-YAPSecretary GeneralHouse of Representatives
Sgd. EMMA LIRIO-REYESSecretary of the Senate
Approved:
Sgd. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYOPresident of the Philippines
December 11, 2009
Tuesday, January 24, 2012
scheckenburger v. moran (1936)
RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER, petitioner, vs. MANUEL V. MORAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondent. EN BANC
[G.R. No. 44896. July 31, 1936.]
Cardenas & Casal for petitioner.
Solicitor-General Hilado for respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; IN GENERAL. — The inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth on November 15, 1935, has brought about a fundamental change in the political and legal status of the Philippines.
2. ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES IS FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE LAND. — The Constitution of the Philippines has become the supreme law of the land since the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth.
3. COURTS; SUPREME COURT; JURISDICTION; ORIGINAL. — The Constitution provides that the original jurisdiction of this court "shall include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT EXCLUSIVE. — The original jurisdiction conferred upon this court by the Constitution over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is not exclusive.
5. ID.; FIRST INSTANCE; JURISDICTION; ORIGINAL. — Prior to the inauguration of the Commonwealth, Courts of First Instance were vested with original jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which a penalty of more than six months' imprisonment or a fine exceeding one hundred dollars might be imposed. Such jurisdiction included the trial of criminal actions brought against consuls.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT EXCLUSIVE. — The original jurisdiction granted to the Courts of First Instance to try criminal cases was not made exclusive by any law in force prior to the inauguration of the Commonwealth, and having reached the conclusion that the jurisdiction conferred upon this court by the Constitution over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is not an exclusive jurisdiction, the laws in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, granting the Courts of First Instance jurisdiction in such cases, are not inconsistent with the Constitution, and must be deemed to remain operative and in force.
7. AMBASSADORS AND CONSULS; CONSULS; PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES. — It is well settled that a consul is not entitled to the privileges and immunities of an ambassador or minister, but is subject to the laws and regulations of the country to which he is accredited. (Ex parte Baiz, 135 U. S., 403; 34 Law. ed., 222.)
8. ID.; ID.; EXEMPTION FROM CRIMINAL PROSECUTION. — A consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution for violations of the laws of the country where he resides. (U. S. vs. Ravaria, 2 Dall.; 297; 1 Law. ed., 388; Wheaton's International Law [2d ed.], 423.)
D E C I S I O N
ABAD SANTOS, J p:
The petitioner was duly accredited honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila, Philippine Islands on June 11, 1934. He was subsequently charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime of falsification of a private document. He objected to the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that both under the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the Philippines the court below had no jurisdiction to try him. His objection having been overruled, he filed this petition for a writ of prohibition with a view to preventing the Court of First Instance of Manila from taking cognizance of the criminal action filed against him.
In support of this petition counsel for the petitioner contend (1) That the Court of First Instance of Manila is without jurisdiction to try the case filed against the petitioner for the reason that under Article III, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States, the Supreme Court of the United States has original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and such jurisdiction excludes the courts of the Philippines; and (2) that even under the Constitution of the Philippines original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
This case involves no question of diplomatic immunity. It is well settled that a consul is not entitled to the privileges and immunities of an ambassador or minister, but is subject to the laws and regulations of the country to which he is accredited. (Ex parte Baiz, 135 U. S., 403; 34 Law. ed., 222.) A consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution for violations of the laws of the country where he resides. (U. S. vs. Ravara, 2 Dall., 297; 1 Law. ed., 388; Wheaton's International Law [2d ed.], 423.) The substantial question raised in this case is one of jurisdiction.
1. We find no merit in the contention that Article III, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States governs this case. We do not deem it necessary to discuss the question whether the constitutional provision relied upon by the petitioner extended ex propio vigore over the Philippines. Suffice it to say that the inauguration of the Philippines. Suffice it to say that the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth on November 15, 1935, has brought about a fundamental change in the political and legal status of the Philippines. On the date mentioned the Constitution of the Philippines went into full force and effect. This Constitution is the supreme law of the land. Not only the members of this court but all other officers, legislative, executive and judicial, of the Government of the Commonwealth, are bound by oath to support the Constitution. (Article XIII, section 2.) This court owes its own existence to that great instrument, and derives all its powers therefrom. In the exercise of its powers and jurisdiction, this court is bound by the provisions of the Constitution. The Constitution provides that the original jurisdiction of this court "shall include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls." In deciding the instant case this court cannot go beyond this constitutional provision.
2. It remains to consider whether the original jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the Constitution over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is exclusive. The Constitution does not define the jurisdiction of this court in specific terms, but merely provides that "the Supreme Court shall have such original and appellate jurisdiction as may be possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution." It then goes on to provide that the original jurisdiction of this court "shall include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls."
In the light of the constitutional provisions above adverted to, the question arises whether the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was exclusive.
The original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was derived from section 17 of Act No. 136, which reads as follows: "The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus, and quo warranto in the cases and in the manner prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, and to hear and determine the controversies thus brought before it, and in other cases provided by law." Jurisdiction to issue writs of quo warranto, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and habeas corpus was also conferred on the Courts of First Instance by the Code of Civil Procedure. (Act No. 190, secs. 197, 217, 222, 226, and 525.) It results that the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was not exclusive of, but concurrent with, that of the Courts of First Instance. Inasmuch as this is the same original jurisdiction vested in this court by the Constitution and made to include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, it follows that the jurisdiction of this court over such cases is not exclusive.
The conclusion we have reached upon this branch of the case finds support in the pertinent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. The Constitution of the United States provides that the Supreme Court shall have "original jurisdiction" in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls. In construing this constitutional provision, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the "original jurisdiction" thus conferred upon the Supreme Court by the Constitution was not an exclusive jurisdiction, and that such grant of original jurisdiction did not prevent Congress from conferring original jurisdiction in cases affecting consuls on the subordinate courts of the Union. (U. S. vs. Ravara, supra; Bors vs. Preston, 111 U.S., 252; 28 Law. ed., 419.).
3. The laws in force in the Philippines prior to the inauguration of the Commonwealth conferred upon the Courts of First Instance original jurisdiction in all criminal cases to which a penalty of more than six months' imprisonment or a fine exceeding one hundred dollars might be imposed. (Act No. 136, sec. 56.) Such jurisdiction included the trial of criminal actions brought against consuls for, as we have already indicated, consuls, not being entitled to the privileges and immunities of ambassadors or ministers, are subject to the laws and regulations of the country where they reside. By Article XV, section 2, of the Constitution, all laws of the Philippine Islands in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution were to continue in force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth; thereafter, they were to remain operative, unless inconsistent with the Constitution, until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly. The original jurisdiction granted to the Courts of First Instance to try criminal cases was not made exclusive by any law in force prior to the inauguration of the Commonwealth, and having reached the conclusion that the jurisdiction conferred upon this court by the Constitution over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is not an exclusive jurisdiction in such cases, are not inconsistent with the Constitution, and must be deemed to remain operative and in force, subject to the power of the National Assembly to amend, alter, modify, or repeal the same. (Asiatic P. Co. vs. Insular Collector of Customs, U.S. Supreme Court [Law. ed.], Adv. Ops., vol. 80, No. 12, pp. 620, 623.).
We conclude, therefore, that the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to try the petitioner, and that the petition for a writ of prohibition must be denied. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz and Recto, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
LAUREL, J., concurring:
In my humble opinion, there are three reasons why the jurisdiction of this court over the petitioner in the instant case is concurrent and not exclusive. The strictly legal reason is set forth in the preceding illuminating opinion. The other reasons are (a) historical and based on what I consider is the (b) theory upon which the grant of legislative authority under our Constitution is predicated.
(a) As the provision in our Constitution regarding jurisdiction in cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, has been taken from the Constitution of the United States, considerable light would be gained by an examination of the history and interpretation thereof in the United States.
The fifth resolution of the New Jersey plan (Paterson resolutions of June 15, 1787) gave the Supreme Court of the United States, the only national court under the plan, authority to hear and determine "by way of appeal, in the dernier resort . . . all cases touching the rights of ambassadors . . .." This clause, however, was not approved. On July 18, the Convention of 1787 voted an extraordinarily broad jurisdiction to the Supreme Court extending "to cases arising under laws passed by the general legislature, and to such other questions as involve the national peace and harmony." This general proposition was considerably narrowed by Randolph in his draft of May 29 which, however, did not mention anything about ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls. But the Committee of Detail, through Rutledge, reported on August 6 as follows: "Article XI, Section 3. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend . . . to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; . . . In . . . cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, . . . this jurisdiction shall be original . . .." On September 12, the Committee on Style reported the provision as follows: "Article III, Section 2. The judicial power shall extend . . . to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls . . . In (all) cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls . . . the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction." This provision was approved in the convention with hardly any amendment or debate and is now found in clause 2, section 2 of Article III of the Constitution of the United States. (The Constitution and the Courts, Article on "Growth of the Constitution", by William M. Meigs, New York, 1924, vol. I, pp. 228, 229. See also Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, Yale University Press, 1934, 3 vols.; Warren, The Making of the Constitution, Boston, 1928, pp. 534-537.).
The word "original", however, was early interpreted as not exclusive. Two years after the adoption of the Federal Constitution, or in 1789, the First Judiciary Act (Act of September 24, 1789, I Stat., c. 20, 687) was approved by the first Congress creating the United States District and Circuit Courts which were nisi prius courts, or courts of first instance which dealth with different items of litigation. The district courts are now the only federal courts of first instance, the circuit courts having been abolished by the Act of March 3, 1911, otherwise known as the Judicial Code. The Judiciary Act of 1787 invested the district courts with jurisdiction, exclusively of the courts of the several state, of all suits against consuls or vice- consuls and the Supreme Court of the United States with original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all suits in which a consul or vice- consul shall be a party. By the passage of the Act of February 18, 1875 (18 Stat., 470, c. 137), the clause giving the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction was repealed and, since then, state courts have had concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts over civil or criminal proceedings against a consul or vice-consul. At the present time, the federal courts exercise exclusive jurisdiction "of suits or proceedings against ambassadors or other public ministers, or their domestics or domestic servants, as a court of law can have consistently with the law of nations; and original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction, of all suits brought by ambassadors, or other public ministers, or in which a consul or vice-consul is a party." (Act of March 3, 1911, 36 Stat., 1156, reenacting sec. 687 of the Act of September 24, 1789; 28 U.S.C.A., sec. 341; Hopkins' Federal Judicial Code, 4th ed., by Babbit, 1934, sec. 24, par. 18.)
The Judiciary Act of 1789 was one of the early and most satisfactory acts passed by the Congress of the United States. It has remained essentially unchanged for more than 145 years. It was prepared chiefly by Oliver Elisworth of Connecticut (1 Ann. Cong., 18, April 7, 1789) one of the ablest jurists in the Constitutional Convention, who was later Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States (1796-1800). It is interesting to note that 10 of the 18 senators and 8 of the members of the House of the first Congress had been among the 55 delegates who actually attended the Convention that adopted the federal Constitution (Warren, Congress, the Constitution and the Supreme Court [Boston, 1935], p. 99). When, therefore, the first Congress approved the Judiciary Act of 1789 vesting in the Supreme Court original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all suits in which a consul or a vice-consul shall be a party, express legislative interpretation as to the meaning of the word "original" as not being exclusive was definitely made and this interpretation has never been repudiated. As stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Ames vs. Kansas ([1884], 111 U. S., 449; 4 S. Ct., 437; 28 Law. ed., 482):
"In view of the practical construction put on this provision of the Constitution by Congress, at the very moment of the organization of the government, and of the significant fact that, from 1789 until now, no court of the United States has ever in its actual adjudications determined to the contrary, we are unable to say that it is not within the power of Congress to grant to the inferior courts of the United States jurisdiction in cases where the Supreme Court has been vested by the Constitution with original jurisdiction. It rests with the legislative department of the government to say to what extent such grants shall be made, and it may safely be assumed that nothing will ever be done to encroach upon the high privileges of those for whose protection the constitutional provision was intended. At any rate, we are unwilling to say that the power to make the grant does not exist."
Dicta in some earlier cases seem to hold that the word "original" means "exclusive" and as observed by Justice Field in United States vs. Louisiana ([1887], 123 U. S., 36; 8 S. Ct., 17; 31 Law. ed., 69), the question has given rise to some differences of opinion among the earlier members of the Supreme Court of the United States. (See, for instance, dissenting opinion of Iredell, J., in U.S. vs. Ravara [1793], 2 Dall., 297; 1 Law. ed., 388.) Reliance was had on more or less general expressions made by Chief Justice Marshall in the case of Marbury vs. Madison ([1803], 1 Cranch, 137; 2 Law. ed., 60), where it was said:
"If congress remains it liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction, where the constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and original jurisdiction where the constitution has declared it shall be appellate; the distribution of jurisdiction, made in the constitution, is form without substance." But Chief Justice Marshall who penned the decision in this case in 1803 had occasion later, in 1821, to explain the meaning and extent of the pronouncements made in the Marbury case. He said:
"In the case of Marbury vs. Madison ([1803], 1 Cranch [U. S.], 137, 172; 2 Law. ed., 60), the single question before the court, so far as that case can be applied to this, was, whether the legislature could give this court original jurisdiction in a case in which the Constitution had clearly not given it, and in which no doubt respecting the construction of the article could possibly be raised. The court decided, and we think very properly, that the legislature could not give original jurisdiction in such a case. But, in the reasoning of the court in support of this decision, some expressions are used which go far beyond it. The counsel for Marbury had insisted on the unlimited discretion of the legislature in the apportionment of the judicial power; and it is against this argument that the reasoning of the court is directed. They say that, if such had been the intention of the article, 'it would certainly have been useless to proceed farther than to define the judicial power, and the tribunals in which it should be vested.' The court says, that such a construction would render the clause, dividing the jurisdiction of the court into original and appellate, totally useless; that 'affirmative words are often, in their operation, negative of other objects than those which are affirmed; and, in this case (in the case of Marbury vs. Madison), a negative or exclusive sense must be given to them, or they have no operation at all.' 'It cannot be presumed,' adds the court, 'that any clause in the Constitution is intended to be without effect; and, therefore, such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it.' The whole reasoning of the court proceeds upon the idea that the affirmative words of the clause giving one sort of jurisdiction, must imply a negative of any other sort of jurisdiction, because otherwise the words would be totally inoperative, and this reasoning is advanced in a case to which it was strictly applicable. If in that case original jurisdiction could have been exercised, the clause under consideration would have been entirely useless. Having such cases only in its view, the court lays down a principle which is generally correct, in terms much broader than the decision, and not only much broader than the reasoning with which that decision is supported, but in some instances contradictory to its principle. The reasoning sustains the negative operation of the words in that case because otherwise the clause would have no meaning whatever, and because such operation was necessary to give effect to the intention of the article. The effort now made is, to apply the conclusion to which the court was conducted by that reasoning in the particular case, to one in which the words have their full operation when understood affirmatively, and in which the negative, or exclusive sense, is to be so used as to defeat some of the great objects of the article. To this construction the court cannot give its assent. The general expressions in the case of Marbury vs. Madison must be understood with the limitations which are given to them in this opinion; limitations which in no degree affect the decision in that case, or the tenor of its reasoning." (Cohens vs. Virginia [1821], 6 Wheat., 264, 400; 5 Law. ed., 257.)
What the Supreme Court in the case of Marbury vs. Madison held then was that Congress could not extend its original jurisdiction beyond the cases expressly mentioned in the Constitution, the rule of construction being that affirmative words of the Constitution declaring in what cases the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction must be construed negatively as to all other cases. (See Ex parte Vallandigham [1864], 1 Wall., 243, 252; 17 Law. ed., 589; Martin vs. Hunter's Lessee [1816], 1 Wheat., 305, 330; 4 Law. ed., 97; U. S. vs. Haynes (D. C. Mass., 1887], 29 Fed., 691, 696.) That was all.
It should be observed that Chief Justice Marshall concurred in the opinion rendered in the case of Davis vs. Packard ([1833], 7 Pet., 276; 8 Law. ed., 684). In this case the jurisdiction of the state court of New York over a civil suit against a foreign consul was denied solely on the ground that jurisdiction had been conferred in such a case upon the district courts of the United States exclusively of the state courts. Such a ground, says Justice Harlan in Bors vs. Preston ([1884], 111 U. S., 252; 4 S. Ct., 407; 28 Law. ed., 419), would probably not have been given had it been believed that the grant of original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court deprived Congress of the power to confer concurrent original jurisdiction in such cases upon subordinate courts of the Union, concluding that the decision in the case "may be regarded as an affirmance of the constitutionality of the Act of 1789, giving original jurisdiction in such cases, also, to District Courts of the United States." Of the seven justices who concurred in the judgment in the case of Davis, five participated in the decision of Osborn vs. Bank of the United States ([1824], 9 Wheat., 738; 6 Law. ed., 204), also penned by Chief Justice Marshall and relied upon as authority together with Marbury vs. Madison, supra.
The rule enunciated in Bors vs. Preston, supra, is the one followed in the United States. The question involved in that case was whether the Circuit Court then existing had jurisdiction under the Constitution and laws of the United States to hear and determine any suit whatever against the consul of a foreign government. Justice Harlan said:
"The Constitution declares that 'The judicial power of the United States shall extend . . . to all cases affecting ambassadors or other public ministers and consuls;' to controversies between citizens of a state and foreign citizens or subjects; that 'In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, . . . the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction;' and that in all other cases previously mentioned in the same clause 'The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.' The Judiciary Act of 1789 invested the District Courts of the United States with jurisdiction, exclusively of the courts of the several States, of all suits against consuls or vice-consuls, except for offenses of a certain character; this court, with 'Original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction of all suits . . . in which a consul or vice-consul shall be a party;' and the circuit courts with jurisdiction of civil suits in which an alien is a party. (1 Stat. at L., 76-80.) In this act we have an affirmance, by the first Congress — many of whose members participated in the Convention which adopted the Constitution and were, therefore, conversant with the purposes of its framers — of the principle that the original jurisdiction of this court of cases in which a consul or vice-consul is a party, is not necessarily exclusive, and that the subordinate courts of the Union may be invested with jurisdiction of cases affecting such representatives of foreign governments. On a question of constitutional construction, this fact is entitled to great weight."
In this case of Bors, Justice Harlan adopted the view entertained by Chief Justice Taney in the earlier case of Gittings vs. Crawford (C. C. Md., 1838; Taney's Dec., 1, 10). In that case of Gittings, it was held that neither public policy nor convenience would justify the Supreme Court in implying that Congress is prohibited from giving original jurisdiction in cases affecting consuls to the inferior judicial tribunals of the United States. Chief Justice Taney said:
"If the arrangement and classification of the subjects of jurisdiction into appellate and original, as respects the Supreme Court, do not exclude that tribunal from appellate power in the cases where original jurisdiction is granted, can it be right, from the same clause, to imply words of exclusion as respects other courts whose jurisdiction is not there limited or prescribed, but left for the future regulation of Congress? The true rule in this case is, I think, the rule which is constantly applied to ordinary acts of legislation, in which the grant of jurisdiction over a certain subject-matter to one court, does not, of itself, imply that that jurisdiction is to be exclusive. In the clause in question, there is nothing but mere affirmative words of grant, and none that import a design to exclude the subordinate jurisdiction of other courts of the United States on the same subject-matter." (See also U.S. vs. Ravara [1793], 2 Dall., 297; 1 Law. ed., 388; United States vs. Louisiana [1887], 123 U. S., 36; 8 S. Ct., 17; 31 Law. ed., 69; Ex parte Baiz [1890], 135 U. S., 403; 10 S. Ct., 854; 34 Law. ed., 222, denying writ of prohibition Hollander vs. Baiz [D. C. N. Y., 1890]; 41 Fed., 732; Iasigi vs. Van de Carr [1897], 166 U. S., 391; 17 S. Ct., 595; 41 Law. ed., 1045; Graham vs. Strucken [C. C. N. Y., 1857]; 4 Blatchf., 58; Lorway vs. Lousada [D. C. Mass., 1866]; Fed. Cas., No. 8517; St. Luke's Hospital vs. Barclay [C. C. N. Y., 1855]; 3 Blatchf., 259; State of Texas vs. Lewis [C. C. Tex., 1882], 14 Fed., 65; State of Alabama vs. Wolffe [C. C. Ala., 1883], 18 Fed., 836, 837; Pooley vs. Luco [D. C. Cal., 1896], 76 Fed., 146.)
It is interesting to note that in the case of St. Luke's Hospital vs. Barclay, supra, the jurisdiction of circuit courts exclusive of state courts over aliens, no exception being made as to those who were consuls, was maintained. (See 1 U. S. Stat. at L., c. 20, sec. 11, pp. 78, 79.)
From the history of, and the judicial interpretation placed on, clause 2, section 2 of Article III of the Constitution of the United States it seems clear that the word "original" in reference to the jurisdiction of Supreme Court of the United States over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, was never intended to be exclusive as to prevent the Congress from vesting concurrent jurisdiction over cases affecting consuls and vice-consuls in other federal courts.
It should be observed that the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 places cases affecting the official representatives of foreign powers under the jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court to prevent the public peace from being jeopardized. Since improper treatment of foreign ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls may be a casus belli, it was thought that the federal government, which is responsible for their treatment under international law, should itself be provided with the means to meet the demands imposed by international duty. (Tucker, The Constitution of the United States [1899], vol. II, 760, 772; vide, The Federalist, No. LXXXI, Ashley's Reprint [1917], 415.) Bearing in mind the distinction which international law establishes between ambassadors and other public ministers, on the one hand, and consuls and other commercial representatives, on the other, Congress saw it fit to provide in one case a rule different from the other, although as far as consuls and vice-consuls are concerned, the jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court, as already observed, though original is not exclusive. But in the United States, there are two judicial systems, independent one from the other, while in the Philippines there is but one judicial system. So that the reason in the United States for excluding certain courts — the state courts — from taking cognizance of cases against foreign representatives stationed in the United States does not obtain in the Philippines where the court of the lowest grade is as much a part of an integrated system as the highest court.
Let us now turn our attention to our own laws as they affect the case of the petitioner. Undoubtedly Philippine courts are not federal courts and they are not governed by the Judiciary Acts of the United States. We have a judicial system of our own, standing outside the sphere of the American federal system and possessing powers and exercising jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of our own Constitution and laws.
The jurisdiction of our courts over consuls is defined and determined by our Constitution and laws which include applicable treaties and accepted rules of the law of nations. There are no treaties between the United States and Uruguay exempting consuls of either country from the operation of local criminal laws. Under the generally accepted principles of international law, declared by our Constitution as part of the law of the nation (Art. II, sec. 3, cl. 2), consuls, vice-consuls and other commercial representatives of foreign nations do not possess the status and can not claim the privileges and immunities accorded to ambassadors and ministers. (Wheaton, International Law, sec. 249; I Kent, Commentaries, 44; Story on the Constitution, sec. 1660; Mathews, The American Constitutional System [1932], 204, 205; Gittings vs. Crawford, C. C. Md., 1838; Taney's Dec., 1; Wilcox vs. Luco, 118 Cal., 639; 45 Pac., 676; 2 C. J., 1305; 9 R. C. L., 161.) The only provisions touching the subject to which we may refer are those found in the Constitution of the Philippines. Let us trace the history of these provisions. The report of the Committee on the Judicial Power, submitted on September 29, 1934, did not contain any provision regarding cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls. The draft of the sub-committee of seven of the Sponsorship Committee, submitted on October 20, 1934, however, contains the following provision:
"Article X, Section 2. The Supreme Court shall have such original jurisdiction as may be possessed and exercised by the present Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, which jurisdiction shall include all cases affecting ambassadors, other foreign ministers and consuls . . .." The Special Committee on the Judiciary, composed principally of Delegates Vicente J. Francisco and Norberto Romualdez, included in its report the provisions which now appear in sections 2 and 3 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Section 2 provides:
"The National Assembly shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls . . .." And the second sentence of section 3 provides:
"The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls."
The provision in our Constitution in so far as it confers upon our Supreme Court "original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls" is literally the same as that contained in clause 2, section 2 of Article III of the United States Constitution.
In the course of the deliberations of the Constitutional Convention, some doubt was expressed regarding the character of the grant of "original jurisdiction" to our Supreme Court. An examination of the records of the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention show that the framers of our Constitution were familiar with the history of, and the judicial construction placed on, the same provision of the United States Constitution. In order to end what would have been a protracted discussion on the subject, a member of the Special Committee on the Judiciary gave the following information to the members of the Convention:
". . . Sr. Presidente, a fin de poder terminar con el Articulo 2, el Comite esta dispuesto a hacer constar que la interpretacion que se debe dar a la ultima parte de dicho articulo es la misma interpretacion que siempre se ha dado a semejante disposicion en la Constitucion de los Estados Unidos." (January 16, 1935.) Without further discussion, the provision was then and there approved.
It thus appears that the provision in question has been given a well-settled meaning in the United States — the country of its origin. It has there received definite and hitherto unaltered legislative and judicial interpretation. And the same meaning was ascribed to it when incorporated in our own Constitution. To paraphrase Justice Gray of the Supreme Court of the United States, we are justified in interpreting the provision of the Constitution in the light of the principles and history with which its framers were familiar. (United States vs. Wong Kin Ark [1897], 169 U. S., 649; 18 S. Ct., 456; 42 Law. ed., 890, cited with approval in Kepner vs. United States, a case of Philippine origin [1904]; 195 U. S., 100; 49 Law. ed., 114.)
(b) What has been said hereinabove is not unnecessary attachment to history or idolatrous adherence to precedents. In referring to the history of this provision of our Constitution it is realized that historical discussion while valuable is not necessarily decisive. Rationally, however, the philosophical reason for the conclusion announced is not far seek if certain principles of constitutional government are borne in mind. The constitution is both a grant of, and a limitation upon, governmental powers. In the absence of clear and unequivocal restraint of legislative authority, the power is retained by the people and is exercisable by their representatives in the legislature. The general rule is that the legislature possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil government. A prohibition to exercise legislative power is the exception. (Denio, C. J., in People vs. Draper, 15 N. Y., 532, 543.) These prohibitions or restrictions are found either in the language used, or in the purposes held in view as well as the circumstances which led to the adoption of the particular provision as part of the fundamental law. (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; 73 S. W., 811; 108 Am. St. Rep., 929.).
Subject to certain limitations, the Filipino people, through their delegates, have committed legislative power in a most general way to the National Assembly of the nation. In other words, the National Assembly has plenary legislative power in all matters of legislation except as limited by the Constitution. When, therefore, the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, without specifying the exclusive character of the grant, the National Assembly is not deprived of its authority to make that jurisdiction concurrent. It has been said that popular government lives because of the inexhaustible reservoir of power behind it. It is unquestionable that the mass of powers of government is vested in the representatives of the people, and that these representatives are no further restrained under our system than by the express language of the instrument imposing the restraint, or by particular provisions which, by clear intendment, have that effect. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, p. 139, ante.) What the Constitution prohibits is merely the deprivation of the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and while it must be admitted that original jurisdiction if made concurrent no longer remains exclusive, it is also true that jurisdiction does not cease to be original merely because it is concurrent.
It is also quite true that concurrent original jurisdiction in this class of cases would mean the sharing of the Supreme Court with the most inferior courts of cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls such that the Supreme Court would have concurrent jurisdiction with the lowest courts in our judicial hierarchy, the justice of the peace courts, in a petty case involving for instance, the violation of a municipal ordinance affecting the parties just mentioned. However, no serious objection to this result can be seen other than the misinterpreted unwillingness to share this jurisdiction with a court pertaining to the lowest category in our judicial organization. Upon the other hand, the fundamental reasoning would apply with equal force if the highest court of the land is made to take cognizance exclusively of a case involving the violation of the municipal ordinance simply because of the character of the parties affected. After alluding to the fact that the position of consul of a foreign government is sometimes filled by a citizen of the United States (and this is also true in the Philippines) Chief Justice Taney, in Gittings vs. Crawford, supra, observed:
"It could hardly have been the intention of the statesmen who framed our constitution to require that one of our citizens who had a petty claim of even less than five dollars against another citizen, who had been clothed by some foreign government with the consular office, should be compelled to go into the Supreme Court to have a jury summoned in order to enable him to recover it; nor could it have been intended, that the time of that court, with all its high duties to perform, should be taken up with the trial of every petty offense that might be committed by a consul in any part of the United States; that consul, too, being often one of our own citizens."
Probably, the most serious objection to the interpretation herein advocated is, that considering the actual distribution of jurisdiction between the different courts in our jurisdiction, there may be cases where the Supreme Court may not actually exercise either original — whether exclusive or concurrent — or appellate jurisdiction, notwithstanding the grant of original jurisdiction in this class of cases to the Supreme Court. If, for instance, a criminal case is brought either in a justice of the peace court or in a Court of First Instance against a foreign consul and no question of law is involved, it is evident that in case of conviction, the proceedings will terminate in the Court of Appeals and will not reach the Supreme Court. In this case, the Supreme Court will be deprived of all jurisdiction in a case affecting a consul notwithstanding the grant thereto in the Constitution of original jurisdiction in all cases affecting consuls. This is a situation, however, created not by the Constitution but by existing legislation, and the remedy is in the hands of the National Assembly. The Constitution cannot deal with with every casus omissus, and in the nature of things, must only deal with fundamental principles, leaving the details of administration and execution to the other branches of the government. It rests with the National Assembly to determine the inferior courts which shall exercise concurrent original jurisdiction with the Supreme Court in cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, considering the nature of the offense and irrespective of the amount of the controversy. The National Assembly may, as in the United States (Cooley, Constitutional Law, 4th ed. [1931], sec. 4, p. 156), provide for appeal to the Supreme Court in all cases affecting foreign diplomatic and consular representatives.
Before the approval of the Constitution, jurisdiction over consuls was exercisable by our courts. This is more so now that the Independence Law and Constitution framed and adopted pursuant thereto are in force. The fact that the National Assembly has not enacted any law determining what courts of the Philippines shall exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court is of no moment. This can not mean and shout not be interpreted to mean that the original jurisdiction vested in the Supreme Court by the Constitution is not concurrent with other national courts of inferior category.
The respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila having jurisdiction to take cognizance of the criminal case brought against the petitioner, the writ of prohibition should be denied.
C o p y r i g h t 1996 C D T e c h n o l o g i e s A s i a I n c
exam covering the U.N.
Instructions: This multiple choice type containing 50 items. Choose the BEST answer and write the letter of your choice in the given answer sheet. You only answer once. No correction or erasure is allowed.
1. Which of the following is not an objective of the United Nations? (a) prevention and removal of threats of peace (b) suppression of acts of aggression (c) to develop friendly relations among nations (d) to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations (e) to use war as an instrument of peace (e) to prosecute heads of states who violate international humanitarian laws.
2. The UNITED NATIONS --- (a) is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members (b) sits in the Hague Netherlands (c) is authorized to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state (d) shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter (e) shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with customs so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.
3. Which of the following is false concerning the membership of a state to the United Nations? (a) state (b) peace-loving (c) accept the obligations contained in the UN Charter (d) willing to carry out the principles international law (e) upon a decision of the Security Council.
4. Which of the following a cardinal principle of the UN? (a) All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter (b) All Members may in their international relations use threat or force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations (C) The Organization shall ensure that states which are NOT Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security (D) the United Nations cannot intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state (E) the UN cannot require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter;
5. Which of the following is not within the jurisdiction of the ICC? (A) the crime of genocide (b) the crimes against humanity (c) disputes arising from treaty interpretations (d) crime of aggression (e) murder
6.Which of the following is NOT considered as genocide? (a) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group (b) killing members of the group (c) Deportation or forcible transfer of population (d) ) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (e) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group.
7. Crimes against humanity is defined as acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack. Which of the following is an example of crimes against humanity?
(a) genocide
(b) aggression
(c) enslavement
(d) ) Killing members of the group
(e) war crimes
8. Which of the following is not considered as a crime against humanity?
(a) Torture
(b) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization
(c) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender
(d) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group
(e) The crime of apartheid
9. The jurisdiction of the ICC is “ ratione temporis”. This means that (a) its jurisdiction is temporary or optional (b) its jurisdiction attaches only with respect to crimes committed after becoming a state party (c) jurisdiction attaches even to non-member states (d) that a state may accept jurisdiction and waive immunity (e) that the Court has jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry of force of the Rome Statute.
10.Articel 20 of the Rome statute speaks about “Ne Bis in Idem”. This means that (a) no person shall be tried before the Court with respect to conduct which formed the basis of crimes for which the person has been convicted or acquitted by the Court (b) No person shall be tried by another court for a crime for which that person has already been convicted or acquitted by the Court(c) no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offence (d) all of the above (e) none of the above.
11.The International Criminal Court shall use what applicable law? (a) the Rome Statute (b) treaties (b) international law of armed conflict (c) national laws of states (d) apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions (e) all of the above.
12. Under the Rome Statute, the principle of nullum crimen sine lege is defined. Which of the following is not a definition of said principle? (a) A person shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court (b) A person shall be criminally responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of its national law (c) The definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. (d) In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favor of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted (e)A person convicted by the Court may be punished only in accordance with this Statute.
13.Which principle states that “In the event of a change in the law applicable to a given case prior to a final judgement, the law more favourable to the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted shall apply” ? (a) Nulla poena sine lege (b) Nullum crimen sine lege (c) Non-retroactivity ratione personae (d) Individual criminal responsibility (e) ratione temporis
13.Which principle states that “In the event of a change in the law applicable to a given case prior to a final judgement, the law more favourable to the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted shall apply” ? (a) Nulla poena sine lege (b) Nullum crimen sine lege (c) Non-retroactivity ratione personae (d) Individual criminal responsibility (e) ratione temporis
14. Under the ICC, the principle is that “The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this Statute”. Which of the following principles support this tenet? (a) Nulla poena sine lege (b) Nullum crimen sine lege (c)Non-retroactivity ratione personae (d) Individual criminal responsibility (e) ratione temporis.
15. Which of the following best describes as to what “SOFT LAW” is? (a) non-binding norm (b) it can influence state behavior (c) the UN Declaration of Human Rights (d) none of the above (e) all of the above.
16. The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. Which statement is NOT correct? (a) this is a statement of the doctrine of transformation (b) the doctrine of Incorporation is illustrated (c) we are bound by the treaty (d) we adopt pacta sunt servanda (e) we support the UN Charter.
17.Under public international law, what statement below is correct with respect to the right to bail? (a) in quarantine cases bail is not available (b) bail can be granted in extradition cases (c) bail can be granted in deportation cases where the accused is detained (d) none of the above (e) all of the above.
18.Which statement is correct with respect to an extradition case? The standard of proof in extradition cases (i.e. whether to grant it or not) is (a) proof beyond reasonable doubt (b) preponderance of evidence (c) clear and convincing evidence (d) substantial evidence (e) none of the above since extradition proceeding is sui generis.
19. Which statement is NOT correct with respect to extradition? (a) it is created by a treaty (b) it demands the surrender of one accused of a crime (c) it is a punishment for a crime (d) it is a trial not to determine the guilt of the accused (e) it is merely basically administrative in character.
20. Which of the following is not a peremptory norm ? (a) jus cogen (b) compelling law (c) an international law principle (d) customary law (e) treaty
21. Which of the following is an example of jus cogens? (a) non-refoulement (b) extraterritoriality (c) anti-slavery norms (d) none of the above (e) all of the above.
22. It is defined as under international law as "a well-marked indentation whose penetration is in such proportion to the width of its mouth as to contain land-locked waters and constitute more than a mere curvature of the coast ---- (a) territorial sea (b) contiguous zone (c) exclusive economic zone (d) bay (e) continental shelf.
23. Which describes correctly our internal waters? (a) Waters landward of the baseline (b) the state has completed jurisdiction (c) archipelagic waters (d) none of the above (e) all of the above.
24. Which is correct about our territorial sea? (a) 12 km (b) 12 nautical miles (c) 44 km (d) 12 miles (e) 200 nautical miles -- from the baseline.
25. It is defined as a band of water extending from the outer edge of the territorial sea to up to twenty four nautical miles (44 km; 28 mi) from the baseline, within which a state can exert limited control for the purpose of preventing or punishing "infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea".---- (a) Territorial sea (b) internal waters (c) contiguous zone (d) exclusive economic zone (e) continental shelf.
26. Which is NOT correct concerning the exclusive economic zone? (a) it extends to a maximum of 200 km from the territorial sea baseline (b) it includes the contiguous zone (c) all economic resources are controlled by a state within this zone (d) it is a coastal nation’s territorial waters (e) all of the above.
27. It extends out to the outer edge but at least 200 nautical miles (370 km; 230 mi) from the baselines of the territorial sea if the continental margin does not stretch that far. It does not stretch beyond 350 nautical miles (650 km; 400 mi) of the baseline, or beyond 100 nautical miles (190 km; 120 mi) from the 2,500 metres (8,200 ft) isobath, which is a line connecting the depths of the seabed at 2,500 meters. (a) Territorial sea (b) internal waters (c) contiguous zone (d) exclusive economic zone (e) continental shelf.
28. On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and states gave recognition and importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed. Which of the following is NOT true concerning the UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS? (A) it is a treaty signed by states (B) the principles contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the international community (C) it is a soft law (d) on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted it (e) it forms part of the law of our land.
29. Which is NOT true about the International Court of Justice? (a) Only states can be parties to a suit before it (b) it can render advisory opinions (c) it is bound by precedents (d) its jurisdiction is optional on the part of the states (e) it uses customary law in deciding cases.
30. Which of the following are the so called trends in international law which our country cannot ignore? (a) the growing importance of the individual person in public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (b) the higher value now being given to human rights in the international sphere; (c) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (d) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other (e) the acceptable subjects of international law are still states and entities which are given international personalities.
31. Which of the following is NOT correct concerning the Warsaw Convention? Plaintiff can bring an action for damages concerning airline violations at his option in (a) the court of any place where the carrier is operating (b) in the court of the domicile of the carrier (c) in the court where the carrier has its principal place of business (d) the court where the carrier has an establishment by which the contract has been made (e) the court of the place of destination.
32. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except (a) under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate (b) the treaty must be ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose (c) the treaty must be recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State (d) only a and b (e) all of the above.
33.Which of the following is not correct concerning the Visiting Forces Agreement? (a) it was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of the United States government (b) The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and consent of the United States Senate detracts it from its status as a binding international agreement or treaty recognized by the said State. (c) as an implementing agreement of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, it was not necessary to submit the VFA to the US Senate for advice and consent, but merely to the US Congress under the Case–Zablocki Act within 60 days of its ratification (d) the US has certified that it recognizes the VFA as a binding international agreement, i.e., a treaty, and this substantially complies with the requirements of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of our Constitution (e) The provision of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of the Constitution, is complied with by virtue of the fact that the presence of the US Armed Forces through the VFA is a presence "allowed under" the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty.
34 Which of the following is a “sole executive agreement” within the American system of treaties? (a) These are advised and consented to by the US Senate in accordance with Art. II, Sec. 2 of the US Constitution (b) These are joint agreements of the President and Congress and need not be submitted to the Senate (c) These are agreements entered into by the President which are submitted to Congress within sixty (60) days of ratification under the provisions of the Case-Zablocki Act, after which they are recognized by the Congress and may be implemented (d) all of the above (e) none of the above.
35. Which word describes the holding that “ treaties entered into by the United States are not automatically part of their domestic law unless these treaties are self-executing or there is an implementing legislation to make them enforceable”--- (a) Medellin (b) Zablocki (c) Martens (d) Kenney (e) Roerich.
36. Which is NOT correct concerning the interpretation of treaties? (a) A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose (b) The state cannot take into account, together with the context any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions (c)the state can take into account any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the party (d) all of the above (e) none of the above.
37.Which of the following statements is erroneous? (a) the fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere (b) From the perspective of public international law, a treaty is favored over municipal law pursuant to the principle of pacta sunt servanda (c) a party to a treaty is allowed to "invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty (d) the provisions of a treaty are always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, or that it is subject to the police power of the State (e) Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislation.
38.The case of Gonzales v. Hechanova ruled that (a) Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislation(b) the fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere (c) From the perspective of public international law, a treaty is favored over municipal law pursuant to the principle of pacta sunt servanda (d) a party to a treaty is allowed to "invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty (e) our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
39. Which of the following may not be considered an en banc case of the Supreme Court (a). Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, executive order, or presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question;(b) Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penalty;(c) Cases raising novel questions of law;(d). Cases affecting ambassadors or other public ministers(e) cases affecting consuls.
40. IT is defined as a record of a routine agreement that has many similarities with the private law contract. The agreement consists two documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by the representative of the other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting State repeats the text of the offering State to record its assent. The signatories of the letters may be government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads. It is frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid the process of legislative approval. ----(a) treaty (b) protocol (c) exchange of notes (d) bilateral treaty (e) executive agreement.
41. It is defined as "an international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation-------- (a) treaty (b) protocol (c) exchange of notes (d) bilateral treaty (e) executive agreement.
42. Which is NOT true concerning treaties and executive agreements? (a) Under international law, there is a big difference between treaties and executive agreements in terms of their binding effects on the contracting states concerned (b) executive agreements are similar to treaties, except that they do not require legislative concurrence and are usually less formal and deal with a narrower range of subject matters than treaties (c) a treaty has greater "dignity" than an executive agreement, because its constitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty having behind it the authority of the President(d) a ratified treaty, unlike an executive agreement, takes precedence over any prior statutory enactment (e) International agreements may be in the form of treaties that require legislative concurrence after executive ratification.
43. The President of the International Court of Justice as of date is (a) Sang-yun Song (b) Sang-Hyun Sang (c) Sang-Hyun Song (d) Ban Ki Moon (e) Jorge Lomanaco .
44.Concerning the ICC, what is the meaning of “primary jurisdiction”? (a) it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes."(b) it is the duty of the ICC to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes (C) the state waives jurisdiction over international law war crime violators in favor of the ICC (D) It is the duty of the state to arrest a person who commits crimes against humanity (e) when a person is tried by the ICC, the municipal court must give way to said trial.
45. Which of the following is not correct? (a)By their nature, treaties cannot have a limiting effect on the otherwise encompassing and absolute nature of sovereignty. (b) By their voluntary act, nations may decide to surrender or waive some aspects of their state power or agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise exclusive and absolute jurisdiction. (c)The usual underlying consideration in this partial surrender may be the greater benefits derived from a pact or a reciprocal undertaking of one contracting party to grant the same privileges or immunities to the other. (d) On the rationale that the Philippines has adopted the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution (e) Such waiver does not amount to an unconstitutional diminution or deprivation of jurisdiction of Philippine courts.
46. Which of the following is NOT correct? (a) under international law there is a considerable difference between a State-Party and a signatory to a treaty (b) Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a signatory state is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty (c) a State-Party is legally obliged to follow all the provisions of a treaty in good faith (d) the Philippines is only a signatory to the Rome Statute and not a State-Party for lack of ratification by the Senate (e) Any argument obliging a signatory to the Rome Statute to follow any provision in the treaty would be premature.
47. The state of X is a state party to the International Criminal Court. State Y is not a signatory to the ICC. State X and Y entered an agreement which states that when a citizen of X commits a crime under the jurisdiction of the ICC in the state of Y, state Y must surrender the person to the state of X and not to the ICC. Which of the following statements is correct? (a) the agreement is invalid as it is contrary to the ICC mandate (b) the agreement is valid since X has primary jurisdiction over said person as he is his citizen (c) the agreement is pursuant to the provisions of the ICC (d) the agreement is valid, as the ICC can also waive jurisdiction over said person (e) the agreement is valid since jurisdiction over the ICC is optional.
48. The Ampatuan massacre can be considered as a crime against humanity. Which of the following is correct? (a) The case can be filed before the ICC (B) The Philippine court may waive jurisdiction over said case in favor of the ICC (C) The ICC cannot have jurisdiction because of the principle of ratione temporis (d) the case must be filed before the ICC so that a fair and expeditious trial can be had (e) The ICC does not have jurisdiction because the Philippines is not yet a signatory to the ICC when the crime was committed.
49. Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 1864 is contained in what Geneva Convention? (a) First (b) Second (c) Third (d) Fourth (e) Fifth.
50. “Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity and the requirements of the public conscience” ---- is actually the (a) Martin’s clause (b) Marten’s clause (c) Roerich’s Pact (d) preamble of the 1899 Hague Convention I (e) Porter Clause
END OF THE EXAMINATION
51. The Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 1906, is contained in what Geneva Convention? (a) First (b) Second (c) Third (d) Fourth (e) Fifth.
52. The Treatment of Prisoners of War, 1929 is contained in what Geneva Convention? (a) First (b) Second (c) Third (d) Fourth (e) Fifth.
53. Protocol I of the 1949 Geneva Convention deals with (a) Protection of Civilians in Non-international conflict (b) Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (c) Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem (d) Treatment of Prisoners of War, 1929 (e) Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
54. Mr. Verstuyf is the head of the World Health Organization. He arrives in the Philippines brining with him a number of baggages which is suspected by the Philippine Intelligence to contain contraband. Which of the following statements is correct? (a) as he is engaged in unlawful acts, his baggages can be searched (b) he cannot be searched because he enjoys immunity from search (c) he can be searched because he violated the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (d) he can be searched through a search warrant that a Judge issues (e) he cannot invoke his immunity as he is suspected of bringing contraband to our country.
55. Which is NOT true about the International Court of Justice? (a) Only states can be parties to a suit before it (b) it can render advisory opinions (c) it is bound by precedents (d) its jurisdiction is optional on the part of the states (e) it uses customary law in deciding cases.
56. Which of the following statements is NOT correct concerning the Security Council? (a) The General Assembly shall elect ten other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first in- stance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of inter- national peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution (b) The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist , the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council (c) The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years (d) A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election. (e) Each member of the Security Council shall have two representatives.
57. Which of the following is considered as an enforcement action of the Security Council? (A) complete interruption of economic relations (B) partial interruption of economic relations (C) interruption of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication (d) the severance of diplomatic relations (e) demonstrations and blockade.
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