EN BANC
G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994
BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO OCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN DOES, respondents.
The City Attorney for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
VITUG, J.:
The
extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human Rights
("CHR") is again placed into focus in this petition for prohibition,
with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction. The
petitioners ask us to prohibit public respondent CHR from further
hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Fermo, et al.
vs. Quimpo, et al."
The case
all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by
Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive
Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under
the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private
respondents (being the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors
Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a
grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to
vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA. 1 Prior
to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private respondents were
informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to
give way to the "People's Park". 2 On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay)
with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary
Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido
Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private
respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA. The complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580. 3 On
23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to
desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending
resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission"
and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR. 4
On
the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents
on 31 July 1990, as well as CHR's own ocular inspection, and convinced
that on 28 July 1990 the petitioners carried out the demolition of
private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, 5 the
CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the disbursement of
financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of the
private respondents to purchase light housing materials and food under
the Commission's supervision and again directed the petitioners to
"desist from further demolition, with the warning that violation of said
order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest." 6
A motion to dismiss, 7 dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. The motion also averred, among other things, that:
1.
this case came about due to the alleged violation by the (petitioners)
of the Inter-Agency Memorandum of Agreement whereby Metro-Manila Mayors
agreed on a moratorium in the demolition of the dwellings of poor
dwellers in Metro-Manila;
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3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed)
that the moratorium referred to therein refers to moratorium in the
demolition of the structures of poor dwellers;
4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor
dwellers but independent business entrepreneurs even this Honorable
Office admitted in its resolution of 1 August 1990 that the complainants
are indeed, vendors;
5. that the complainants (were) occupying government
land, particularly the sidewalk of EDSA corner North Avenue, Quezon
City; . . . and
6.
that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and exclusive
discretion and authority whether or not a certain business establishment
(should) be allowed to operate within the jurisdiction of Quezon City,
to revoke or cancel a permit, if already issued, upon grounds clearly
specified by law and ordinance. 8
During
the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement,
arguing that the motion to dismiss set for 21 September 1990 had yet to
be resolved. The petitioners likewise manifested that they would bring
the case to the courts.
On 18
September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the
petitioners, stating that the Commission's authority should be
understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of
civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in
this case (were) not civil and political rights, (but) their privilege
to engage in business." 9
On
21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for
resolution, along with the contempt charge that had meantime been filed
by the private respondents, albeit vigorously objected to by petitioners
(on the ground that the motion to dismiss was still then unresolved). 10
In an Order, 11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them.
On 1 March 1991, 12 the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and supplemental motion to dismiss, in this wise:
Clearly,
the Commission on Human Rights under its constitutional mandate had
jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the squatters-vendors who
complained of the gross violations of their human and constitutional
rights. The motion to dismiss should be and is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. 13
The CHR
opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional)
Commission to create only a paper tiger limited only to investigating
civil and political rights, but it (should) be (considered) a
quasi-judicial body with the power to provide appropriate legal measures
for the protection of human rights of all persons within the
Philippines . . . ." It added:
The
right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right to
development, to life and to dignity. All these brazenly and violently
ignored and trampled upon by respondents with little regard at the same
time for the basic rights of women and children, and their health,
safety and welfare. Their actions have psychologically scarred and
traumatized the children, who were witness and exposed to such a violent
demonstration of Man's inhumanity to man.
In an Order, 14 dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this recourse.
The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution 15 of 25 June 1991; it was subsequently reinstated, however, in our resolution 16 of
18 June 1991, in which we also issued a temporary restraining order,
directing the CHR to "CEASE and DESIST from further hearing CHR No.
90-1580." 17
The petitioners pose the following:
Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:
a) to investigate the alleged violations of the
"business rights" of the private respondents whose stalls were
demolished by the petitioners at the instance and authority given by the
Mayor of Quezon City;
b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and
c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition.
In the
Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor-General was excused
from filing his comment for public respondent CHR. The latter thus
filed its own comment, 18 through
Hon. Samuel Soriano, one of its Commissioners. The Court also resolved
to dispense with the comment of private respondent Roque Fermo, who had
since failed to comply with the resolution, dated 18 July 1991,
requiring such comment.
The petition has merit.
The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987
Constitution. 19 It was formally constituted by then President Corazon Aquino via Executive Order No. 163, 20 issued
on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her legislative power at the time. It
succeeded, but so superseded as well, the Presidential Committee on
Human Rights. 21
The powers and functions 22 of the Commission are defined by the 1987 Constitution, thus: to —
(1)
Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of
human rights violations involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of
procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance
with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the
protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as
well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures
and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have
been violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to
promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of
violations of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person
whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is
necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation
conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
In
its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the
CHR theorizes that the intention of the members of the Constitutional
Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial body. 23 This view, however, has not heretofore been shared by this Court. In Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights, 24 the
Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres
Narvasa, has observed that it is "only the first of the enumerated
powers and functions that bears any resemblance to adjudication or
adjudgment," but that resemblance can in no way be synonymous to the
adjudicatory power itself. The Court explained:
. .
. (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the
fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this
country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e.,
receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human
rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding
is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a
court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The
function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual
conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of
applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be
provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
After thus
laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to the other
kernel of this controversy and, its is, to determine the extent of CHR's
investigative power.
It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human
rights" is so generic a term that any attempt to define it, albeit not a
few have tried, could at best be described as inconclusive. Let us
observe. In a symposium on human rights in the Philippines, sponsored by
the University of the Philippines in 1977, one of the questions that
has been propounded is "(w)hat do you understand by "human rights?" The
participants, representing different sectors of the society, have given
the following varied answers:
Human rights
are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity.
They are the same in all parts of the world, whether the Philippines or
England, Kenya or the Soviet Union, the United States or Japan, Kenya or
Indonesia . . . .
Human rights
include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and property;
freedom of speech, of the press, of religion, academic freedom, and the
rights of the accused to due process of law; political rights, such as
the right to elect public officials, to be elected to public office, and
to form political associations and engage in politics; and social
rights, such as the right to an education, employment, and social
services. 25
Human rights
are the entitlement that inhere in the individual person from the sheer
fact of his humanity. . . . Because they are inherent, human rights are
not granted by the State but can only be recognized and protected by
it. 26
(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 27
Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part of his natural birth, right, innate and inalienable. 28
The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more specifically,
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests that the
scope of human rights can be understood to include those that relate to
an individual's social, economic, cultural, political and civil
relations. It thus seems to closely identify the term to the universally
accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is
generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights,
encompassing almost all aspects of life.
Have these
broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers of our 1986
Constitutional Commission in adopting the specific provisions on human
rights and in creating an independent commission to safeguard these
rights? It may of value to look back at the country's experience under
the martial law regime which may have, in fact, impelled the inclusions
of those provisions in our fundamental law. Many voices have been heard.
Among those voices, aptly represented perhaps of the sentiments
expressed by others, comes from Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, a respected
jurist and an advocate of civil liberties, who, in his paper, entitled
"Present State of Human Rights in the Philippines," 29 observes:
But
while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973 enshrined in their Bill
of Rights most of the human rights expressed in the International
Covenant, these rights became unavailable upon the proclamation of
Martial Law on 21 September 1972. Arbitrary action then became the rule.
Individuals by the thousands became subject to arrest upon suspicion,
and were detained and held for indefinite periods, sometimes for years,
without charges, until ordered released by the Commander-in-Chief or
this representative. The right to petition for the redress of grievances
became useless, since group actions were forbidden. So were strikes.
Press and other mass media were subjected to censorship and short term
licensing. Martial law brought with it the suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus, and judges lost independence and security of tenure,
except members of the Supreme Court. They were required to submit
letters of resignation and were dismissed upon the acceptance thereof.
Torture to extort confessions were practiced as declared by
international bodies like Amnesty International and the International
Commission of Jurists.
Converging
our attention to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we can
see the following discussions during its 26 August 1986 deliberations:
MR.
GARCIA . . . , the primacy of its (CHR) task must be made clear in view
of the importance of human rights and also because civil and political
rights have been determined by many international covenants and human
rights legislations in the Philippines, as well as the Constitution,
specifically the Bill of Rights and subsequent legislation. Otherwise,
if we cover such a wide territory in area, we might diffuse its
impact and the precise nature of its task, hence, its effectivity would
also be curtailed.
So, it is important to delienate the parameters of its tasks so that the commission can be most effective.
MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because
civil and political rights are very broad. The Article on the Bill of
Rights covers civil and political rights. Every single right of an
individual involves his civil right or his political right. So, where do
we draw the line?
MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political
rights have been made clear in the language of human rights advocates,
as well as in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which addresses a
number of articles on the right to life, the right against torture, the
right to fair and public hearing, and so on. These are very specific
rights that are considered enshrined in many international documents and
legal instruments as constituting civil and political rights, and these
are precisely what we want to defend here.
MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil and political rights as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights distinguished this
right against torture.
MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the other rights that we have?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will
encompass social and economic rights, and there are other violations of
rights of citizens which can be addressed to the proper courts and
authorities.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission to
define its functions, and, therefore, in doing that the commission will
be authorized to take under its wings cases which perhaps heretofore or
at this moment are under the jurisdiction of the ordinary investigative
and prosecutorial agencies of the government. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier
that we would like to define the specific parameters which cover civil
and political rights as covered by the international standards governing
the behavior of governments regarding the particular political and
civil rights of citizens, especially of political detainees or
prisoners. This particular aspect we have experienced during martial law
which we would now like to safeguard.
MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I
had. Therefore, what we are really trying to say is, perhaps, at the
proper time we could specify all those rights stated in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and defined as human rights. Those are the
rights that we envision here?
MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. They are integral parts of that.
MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman saying that all the rights under the Bill of Rights covered by human rights?
MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil and political rights.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the
scope of human rights, I would like to state that in the past regime,
everytime we invoke the violation of human rights, the Marcos regime
came out with the defense that, as a matter of fact, they had defended
the rights of people to decent living, food, decent housing and a life
consistent with human dignity.
So, I think we should really limit the definition of human rights to political rights. Is that the sense of the committee, so as not to confuse the issue?
MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.
MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond also to repeated points raised by the previous speaker.
There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human Rights could act effectively:
1) protection of rights of political detainees; 2) treatment of
prisoners and the prevention of tortures; 3) fair and public trials; 4)
cases of disappearances; 5) salvagings and hamletting; and 6) other
crimes committed against the religious.
xxx xxx xxx
The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.
I would like to start by saying that I agree with Commissioner Garcia that we should, in order to make the proposed Commission more effective, delimit as much as possible, without prejudice to future expansion. The coverage of the concept and jurisdictional area of the term "human rights".
I was actually disturbed this morning when the reference was made
without qualification to the rights embodied in the universal
Declaration of Human Rights, although later on, this was qualified to
refer to civil and political rights contained therein.
If I remember correctly, Madam President,
Commissioner Garcia, after mentioning the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights of 1948, mentioned or linked the concept of human right with
other human rights specified in other convention which I do not
remember. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to the Declaration of Torture of 1985?
MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner mentioned another.
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights of which we are
signatory.
MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that,
although I have a copy of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
here, I do not have a copy of the other covenant mentioned. It is quite
possible that there are rights specified in that other convention which
may not be specified here. I was wondering whether it would be wise to
link our concept of human rights to general terms like "convention,"
rather than specify the rights contained in the convention.
As far as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
is concerned, the Committee, before the period of amendments, could
specify to us which of these articles in the Declaration will fall
within the concept of civil and political rights, not for the purpose of
including these in the proposed constitutional article, but to give the
sense of the Commission as to what human rights would be included,
without prejudice to expansion later on, if the need arises. For
example, there was no definite reply to the question of Commissioner
Regalado as to whether the right to marry would be considered a civil or
a social right. It is not a civil right?
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat the
various specific civil and political rights that we felt must be
envisioned initially by this provision — freedom from political
detention and arrest prevention of torture, right to fair and public
trials, as well as crimes involving disappearance, salvagings,
hamlettings and collective violations. So, it is limited to
politically related crimes precisely to protect the civil and political
rights of a specific group of individuals, and therefore, we are not
opening it up to all of the definite areas.
MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the
record, the Gentlemen is no longer linking his concept or the concept of
the Committee on Human Rights with the so-called civil or political
rights as contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, I was referring to an international instrument.
MR. GUINGONA. I know.
MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will refer
to each and every specific article therein, but only to those that
pertain to the civil and politically related, as we understand it in
this Commission on Human Rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not even clear as to the distinction between civil and social rights.
MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants:
the International Covenant and Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The
second covenant contains all the different rights-the rights of labor to
organize, the right to education, housing, shelter, et cetera.
MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the moment the sense of the committee to those that the Gentlemen has specified.
MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.
xxx xxx xxx
SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint of the
victims of human rights, I cannot stress more on how much we need a
Commission on Human Rights. . . .
. . . human rights victims are usually penniless.
They cannot pay and very few lawyers will accept clients who do not pay.
And so, they are the ones more abused and oppressed. Another reason is, the cases involved are very delicate — torture, salvaging, picking up without any warrant of arrest, massacre
— and the persons who are allegedly guilty are people in power like
politicians, men in the military and big shots. Therefore, this Human
Rights Commission must be independent.
I
would like very much to emphasize how much we need this commission,
especially for the little Filipino, the little individual who needs this
kind of help and cannot get it. And I think we should concentrate
only on civil and political violations because if we open this to land,
housing and health, we will have no place to go again and we will not
receive any response. . . . 30 (emphasis supplied)
The final
outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987
Constitution, is a provision empowering the Commission on Human Rights
to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of
human rights violations involving civil and political rights" (Sec. 1).
The term "civil rights," 31 has been defined as referring —
(t)o
those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country,
or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with
the organization or administration of the government. They include the
rights of property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of
contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil rights are rights
appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or
community. Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to rights
capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action.
Also
quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude,
religious persecution, unreasonable searches and seizures, and
imprisonment for debt. 32
Political rights, 33 on
the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly
or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government,
the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of
petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government. 34
Recalling
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is
readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human
Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human
rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas
as the "(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment
of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials,
(4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6)
other crimes committed against the religious." While the enumeration has
not likely been meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just
expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for
the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take
comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the CHR's
scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to
resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of
violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of the
Commission, taking into account its recommendation." 35
In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia,
as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land
which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park". More than
that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court
can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent
danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is
indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated
is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in
fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards hereinabove
discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia
of the private respondents can fall within the compartment of "human
rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the
Constitution.
On its
contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its
operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for
violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly,
the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules,
its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt,
and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure
and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite
for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only to violations
of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential
to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite
for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate
with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who
decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative
work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining
order) in the instance before us, however, is not investigatorial in
character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not
possess. In Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on Human Rights, 36 the Court, speaking through Madame Justice Carolina Griño-Aquino, explained:
The
constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive
measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human
rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to
confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or
writ of injunction for, it that were the intention, the Constitution
would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the
Constitution or by law". It is never derived by implication.
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid
services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and
judicial remedies (including a writ of preliminary injunction) which the
CHR may seek from proper courts on behalf of the victims of human
rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no
jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may
only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is
pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals,
or of the Supreme Court. . . . A writ of preliminary injunction is an
ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action,
for the preservation or protection of the rights and interests of a
party thereto, and for no other purpose." (footnotes omitted).
The
Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action,
its findings and recommendations to any appropriate agency of
government. 37
The
challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way
of financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition is not an
appropriate issue in the instant petition. Not only is there lack of locus standi
on the part of the petitioners to question the disbursement but, more
importantly, the matter lies with the appropriate administrative
agencies concerned to initially consider.
The public
respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the
petitioners has become moot and academic since the case before it (CHR
Case No. 90-1580) has already been fully heard, and that the matter is
merely awaiting final resolution. It is true that prohibition is a
preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and
not intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished. 38 Here,
however, said Commission admittedly has yet to promulgate its
resolution in CHR Case No. 90-1580. The instant petition has been
intended, among other things, to also prevent CHR from precisely doing
that. 39
WHEREFORE,
the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The Commission on
Human Rights is hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case
No. 90-1580 and from implementing the P500.00 fine for contempt. The
temporary restraining order heretofore issued by this Court is made
permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason and Puno, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I reiterate
my separate opinion in "Carino, et al. vs. The Commission on Human
rights, et al.," G.R. No. 96681, 2 December 1991, 204 SCRA 483 in
relation to the resolution of 29 January 1991 and my dissenting opinion
in "Export Processing Zone Authority vs. The Commission on Human Rights,
et al.," G.R. No. 101476, 14 April 1992, 208 SCRA 125. I am of the
considered view that the CHR can issue a cease and desist order to
maintain a status quo pending its investigation of a case
involving an alleged human rights violation; that such cease and desist
order maybe necessary in situations involving a threatened violation of
human rights, which the CHR intents to investigate.
In the case at bench, I would consider the threatened demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderias as well as the temporary shanties owned by the private respondents as posing prima facie
a case of human rights violation because it involves an impairment of
the civil rights of said private respondents, under the definition of
civil rights cited by the majority opinion (pp. 20-21) and which the CHR
has unquestioned authority to investigate (Section 18, Art. XIII, 1987
Constitution).
Human rights demand more than lip service and extend
beyond impressive displays of placards at street corners. Positive
action and results are what count. Certainly, the cause of human rights
is not enhanced when the very constitutional agency tasked to protect
and vindicate human rights is transformed by us, from the start, into a
tiger without dentures but with maimed legs to boot. I submit the CHR
should be given a wide latitude to look into and investigate situations
which may (or may not ultimately) involve human rights violations.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for further proceedings.
# Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I reiterate
my separate opinion in "Carino, et al. vs. The Commission on Human
rights, et al.," G.R. No. 96681, 2 December 1991, 204 SCRA 483 in
relation to the resolution of 29 January 1991 and my dissenting opinion
in "Export Processing Zone Authority vs. The Commission on Human Rights,
et al.," G.R. No. 101476, 14 April 1992, 208 SCRA 125. I am of the
considered view that the CHR can issue a cease and desist order to
maintain a status quo pending its investigation of a case
involving an alleged human rights violation; that such cease and desist
order maybe necessary in situations involving a threatened violation of
human rights, which the CHR intents to investigate.
In the case at bench, I would consider the threatened demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderias as well as the temporary shanties owned by the private respondents as posing prima facie
a case of human rights violation because it involves an impairment of
the civil rights of said private respondents, under the definition of
civil rights cited by the majority opinion (pp. 20-21) and which the CHR
has unquestioned authority to investigate (Section 18, Art. XIII, 1987
Constitution).
Human rights demand more than lip service and extend
beyond impressive displays of placards at street corners. Positive
action and results are what count. Certainly, the cause of human rights
is not enhanced when the very constitutional agency tasked to protect
and vindicate human rights is transformed by us, from the start, into a
tiger without dentures but with maimed legs to boot. I submit the CHR
should be given a wide latitude to look into and investigate situations
which may (or may not ultimately) involve human rights violations.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for further proceedings.
#Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 16.
2 Rollo, p. 17.
3 Ibid., pp. 16-17.
4 Ibid., p. 21.
5 Ibid., see also Annex "C-3", Rollo, pp. 102-103.
6 Ibid., p. 79.
7 Annex "C", Rollo, p. 26.
8 Rollo, pp. 26-27.
9 Annex "E", Ibid., p. 34.
10 Rollo, p. 5.
11 Annex "F", Petition, rollo, pp. 36-42.
12 Annex "G", Petition, Rollo, pp. 44-46.
13 Rollo, p. 46.
14 Annex "J", pp. 56-57.
15 Rollo, p. 59.
16 Ibid., p. 66.
17 Ibid., p. 67.
18 Rollo, pp. 77-88.
19 Art. XIII, Sec. 17, [1].
20 DECLARING THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE CREATION OF THE COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, PROVIDING
GUIDELINES FOR THE OPERATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
21 Ibid., Sec. 17, [3]; E.O. No. 163, Sec. 4.
22 Ibid., Sec. 18.
23 Rollo, p. 45.
24 204 SCRA 483, 492.
25 Remigio Agpalo, Roxas Professor of Political Science, University
of the Philippines, Human Rights in the Philippines: An Unassembled
Symposium, 1977, pp. 1-2.
26 Emerenciana Arcellana, Department of Political Science, U.P., Ibid., pp. 2-3.
27 Nick Joaquin, National Artist, Ibid., p. 15.
28 Salvador Lopez, Professor, U.P. Law Center, Ibid., p. 20.
29 Submitted to the LAWASIA Human Rights Standing Committee: Recent Trends in Human Rights, circa, 1981-1982, pp. 47-52.
30 Records of the Constitutional Commission, Volume 3, pp. 722-723; 731; 738-739.
31 Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth edition, 1324; Handbook of American Constitutional Law, (4th ed., 1927), p. 524.
32 Malcolm, The Constitutional Law of the Philippine Islands, (2nd ed., 1926),
pp. 431-457.
33 Black's Law Dictionary, Ibid., p. 1325.
34 Anthony vs. Burrow, 129 F. 783, 789 [1904].
35 Sec. 19, Art. XIII.
36 208 SCRA 125, 131.
37 See Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on Human Rights,
208 SCRA 125.
38 Cabañero vs. Torres, 61 Phil. 523; Agustin vs. dela Fuente, 84 Phil. 515; Navarro vs. Lardizabal, 25 SCRA 370.
39 See Magallanes vs. Sarita, 18 SCRA 575.
