There is no question that a foreign law may have extraterritorial effect in a country other than the country of origin, provided the latter, in which it is sought to be made operative, gives its consent thereto. This principle is supported by the unquestioned authority.
The jurisdiction of the nation within its territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power in which would impose such restriction. All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source. This consent may be either express or implied. (Philippine Political Law by Sinco, pp. 27-28, citing Chief Justice Marshall's statement in the Exchange, 7 Cranch 116)
In the course of his dissenting opinion in the case of S. S. Lotus, decided by the Permanent Court of International Justice, John Bassett Moore said:
1. It is an admitted principle of International Law that a nation possesses and exercises within its own territory an absolute and exclusive jurisdiction, and that any exception to this right must be traced to the consent of the nation, either express or implied (Schooner Exchange vs. McFadden [812], 7 Cranch 116, 136). The benefit of this principle equally enures to all independent and sovereign States, and is attended with a corresponding responsibility for what takes place within the national territory. (Digest of International Law, by Backworth, Vol. II, pp. 1-2)
The above principle is not denied by respondent-appellant. But its argument on this appeal is that while the acts enacted by the Philippine Congress impliedly accept the benefits of the operation of the United States law (Philippine Property Act of 1946), no provision in the said acts of the Philippine Congress makes said United States law expressly applicable. In answer to this contention, it must be stated that the consent of a Senate to the operation of a foreign law within its territory does not need to be express; it is enough that said consent be implied from its conduct or from that of its authorized officers.
515. No rule of International Law exists which prescribe a necessary form of ratification. — Ratification can, therefore, be given tacitly as well as expressly. Tacit ratification takes place when a State begins the execution of a treaty without expressly ratifying it. It is usual for ratification to take the form of a document duly signed by the Heads of the States concerned and their Secretaries for Foreign Affairs. It is usual to draft as many documents as there are parties to the Convention, and to exchange these documents between the parties. Occasionally the whole of the treaty is recited verbatim in the ratifying documents, but sometimes only the title, preamble, and date of the treaty, and the names of the signatory representatives are cited. As ratification is only the confirmation of an already existing treaty, the essential requirements in a ratifying document is merely that it should refer clearly and unmistakably to the treaty to be ratified. The citation of title, preamble, date, and names of the representatives is, therefore quite sufficient to satisfy that requirements. (Oppenheim, pp. 818-819; emphasis ours.)
International Law does not require that agreements between nations must be concluded in any particular form or style. The law of nations is much more interested in the faithful performance of international obligations than in prescribing procedural requirements. (Treaties and Executive Agreements, by Myers S. McDougal and Asher Lands, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 54, pp. 318-319)
In the case at bar, our ratification of or concurrence to the agreement for the extension of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 is clearly implied from the acts of the President of the Philippines and of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, as well as by the enactment of Republic Acts Nos. 7, 8, and 477.
We must emphasize the fact that the operation of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 in the Philippines is not derived from the unilateral act of the United States Congress, which made it expressly applicable, or from the saving provision contained in the proclamation of independence. It is well-settled in the United States that its laws have no extraterritorial effect. The application of said law in the Philippines is based concurrently on said act (Philippine Property Act of 1946) and on the tacit consent thereto and the conduct of the Philippine Government itself in receiving the benefits of its provisions.
G.R. No. L-5731 June 22, 1954
HERBERT BROWNELL, JR., as Attorney General of the United States, petitioner-appellee, vs.SUN LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA, respondent-appellant
The jurisdiction of the nation within its territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power in which would impose such restriction. All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source. This consent may be either express or implied. (Philippine Political Law by Sinco, pp. 27-28, citing Chief Justice Marshall's statement in the Exchange, 7 Cranch 116)
In the course of his dissenting opinion in the case of S. S. Lotus, decided by the Permanent Court of International Justice, John Bassett Moore said:
1. It is an admitted principle of International Law that a nation possesses and exercises within its own territory an absolute and exclusive jurisdiction, and that any exception to this right must be traced to the consent of the nation, either express or implied (Schooner Exchange vs. McFadden [812], 7 Cranch 116, 136). The benefit of this principle equally enures to all independent and sovereign States, and is attended with a corresponding responsibility for what takes place within the national territory. (Digest of International Law, by Backworth, Vol. II, pp. 1-2)
The above principle is not denied by respondent-appellant. But its argument on this appeal is that while the acts enacted by the Philippine Congress impliedly accept the benefits of the operation of the United States law (Philippine Property Act of 1946), no provision in the said acts of the Philippine Congress makes said United States law expressly applicable. In answer to this contention, it must be stated that the consent of a Senate to the operation of a foreign law within its territory does not need to be express; it is enough that said consent be implied from its conduct or from that of its authorized officers.
515. No rule of International Law exists which prescribe a necessary form of ratification. — Ratification can, therefore, be given tacitly as well as expressly. Tacit ratification takes place when a State begins the execution of a treaty without expressly ratifying it. It is usual for ratification to take the form of a document duly signed by the Heads of the States concerned and their Secretaries for Foreign Affairs. It is usual to draft as many documents as there are parties to the Convention, and to exchange these documents between the parties. Occasionally the whole of the treaty is recited verbatim in the ratifying documents, but sometimes only the title, preamble, and date of the treaty, and the names of the signatory representatives are cited. As ratification is only the confirmation of an already existing treaty, the essential requirements in a ratifying document is merely that it should refer clearly and unmistakably to the treaty to be ratified. The citation of title, preamble, date, and names of the representatives is, therefore quite sufficient to satisfy that requirements. (Oppenheim, pp. 818-819; emphasis ours.)
International Law does not require that agreements between nations must be concluded in any particular form or style. The law of nations is much more interested in the faithful performance of international obligations than in prescribing procedural requirements. (Treaties and Executive Agreements, by Myers S. McDougal and Asher Lands, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 54, pp. 318-319)
In the case at bar, our ratification of or concurrence to the agreement for the extension of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 is clearly implied from the acts of the President of the Philippines and of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, as well as by the enactment of Republic Acts Nos. 7, 8, and 477.
We must emphasize the fact that the operation of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 in the Philippines is not derived from the unilateral act of the United States Congress, which made it expressly applicable, or from the saving provision contained in the proclamation of independence. It is well-settled in the United States that its laws have no extraterritorial effect. The application of said law in the Philippines is based concurrently on said act (Philippine Property Act of 1946) and on the tacit consent thereto and the conduct of the Philippine Government itself in receiving the benefits of its provisions.
G.R. No. L-5731 June 22, 1954
HERBERT BROWNELL, JR., as Attorney General of the United States, petitioner-appellee, vs.SUN LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA, respondent-appellant
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